



Crushed but

not defeated

The impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria

Summary report



OpenDoors
Im Dienst der verfolgten Christen weltweit



Christian Association of Nigeria

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Executive Summary

Nigeria is a country torn in two. While Southern Nigeria is economically stable and enjoys relative peace, Northern Nigeria is rattled by continuing targeted attacks of violent groups, social and economic insecurity and ethno-religious conflicts between various groups. Especially Christians living in these areas have been bearing the brunt of this violence and insecurity. Northern Nigeria hosts a substantial Christian population in the area where Islam meets Christianity. With an estimated thirty million adherents in the Northern region, it is the largest minority in a mainly Muslim environment. This environment has become ever more hostile in recent decades, leading to growing marginalization and discrimination, as well as widespread attacks on Christians, especially in the last fifteen years.

Even though Nigeria is a secular state with a constitution that guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the reality in Northern Nigeria is radically different. For decades, Christians in the region have suffered marginalization and discrimination as well as targeted violence. This is happening not only in the Sharia states of the Far North where the pressure of Islam is hard felt, but also in the non-Sharia Middle Belt states where Sharia has not been formally implemented.

This research report of Open Doors International, named 'Crushed but not defeated, the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria' lists the effects of violence on Christian communities, church activities and individual Christians.

The problem statement is:

What has been the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria and what can be done to end the violence and re-establish the Church in all regions of Northern Nigeria?

The following research questions were formulated and answered:

- What constitutes Northern Nigeria?
- How was this region created?
- What is the history of the Church in Northern Nigeria?
- How did the violence begin, develop and spread?
- What is the impact of the persistent violence on the Christian community in Northern Nigeria?
- How is the Church responding to the violence?
- What conclusions can be drawn from the research and what recommendations can be given to policymakers in church, government and society to end the violence and to restore the Church in Northern Nigeria to live a normal life again?

The research shows that decades of targeted religious violence has had an even larger impact on the Church in Northern Nigeria than previously expected. The violence against Christians in the region has resulted in thousands of people killed, including between 9,000 to 11,500 Christians – a conservative estimation according to this report. A large number of Christian properties has been destroyed, including 13,000 churches that have either been destroyed or closed down. According to the report, over a million Christians in Northern Nigeria have become internally displaced or have settled in other areas of Nigeria in search for safety and security.

In several areas in Northern Nigeria, the Christian presence has become virtually extinct or substantially diminished while in other areas church congregations have grown due to an influx of Christians fleeing violence and a number of Muslims converting to Christianity.

To add to this, social cohesion between Muslims and Christians has been severely affected. Mutual trust has disappeared and Muslims and Christians have become increasingly separate groups, clustering together in town suburbs and distinguished rural areas.

The report shows that even though ethnicity, political conflict and strive for resources are known sources of violence in Northern Nigeria, the sources of violence against Christians in Northern Nigeria have been proven to be much more diverse. There can be religious, political, economic and social undertones at the same time. Drivers of targeted violence against Christians in Northern Nigeria are connected through a common religious denominator: defending northern Muslims' interests, Muslim identity and the position of Islam. Not just radical Islam, Boko Haram being the most notable example, but also Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen and the Northern Muslim political and religious elite are also major actors of targeted violence towards the Christian minority.

The report's conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. Christians in Northern Nigeria face violence from different sides;
2. A minimum of 9,000-11,500 Christians have been killed;
3. 1.3 million Christians have become internally displaced or forced to relocate elsewhere, since 2000;
4. Many churches have seen a steep decline in their memberships, 13,000 churches have been closed or destroyed altogether;
5. Thousands of Christian businesses, houses and other property have been destroyed;
6. Distrust and fear of Christians towards Muslims have hugely increased, leading to more segregation;
7. Christians in Northern Nigeria frequently face marginalization and discrimination, especially in the Sharia states in the Far North, but also in the Middle Belt states;
8. Participation in church activities as well as the private life of Christians have been severely affected. There has been a steep decline due to insecurity and migration, but there is also an increased commitment amongst the Christians that have stayed behind;
9. All over Northern Nigeria, the impact of persistent violence on Christian communities is enormous (decrease in numbers, traumatization, being overwhelmed by the influx of displaced and relocating Christian, loss of property and lack of resources);
10. Christians in Northern Nigeria have reported an increased experience of connection with God and His presence;
11. To adopt the Christian attitude of 'love your enemies' is seen as a real challenge by Christians;
12. Christians affected by targeted violence have been left severely traumatized.

The challenge for the Church in Northern Nigeria is also much larger than previously thought. It will have to find a way to exist in areas where the Christian presence has become virtually extinct. It will have to deal with traumatization as a result of continued violent attacks. It will need to provide leadership and guidance to Christians on how to deal with and respond to the violence. Moreover, Christian communities in Sharia states especially but also in other parts of Northern Nigeria face the challenge to withstand the pressure of an environment that marginalizes and discriminates. Nevertheless, there is still a large Christian presence in Northern Nigeria with potential to unite and stand strong. But the Church in Northern Nigeria will need to find a way to not close in on itself and disengage from society. It should do the opposite, stimulated by its Christian drive to be involved in society and work for justice, peace and reconciliation by sharing its resources to the benefit of all.

Last but not least, the Church in Northern Nigeria together with the Church in Southern Nigeria needs to develop a concerted response in terms of vision, plans and actions to deal with the impact of persistent violence, effectively support affected Christians, to work towards peace and promote social cohesion between different groups in society. In order to do this, it needs the help of the international community so the Church can work for renewal and transformation of the Christian community and Northern Nigerian society at large.

Acknowledgement

The author expresses his gratitude to Church leaders, lay Christians and scientists in Northern Nigeria that contributed to the report through their participation in In-Depth Interviews, Structured Interviews and Focus Group Discussions. The interviews and discussions were all done in June 2014.

The report was read, appreciated and commented upon by three professors in Northern Nigeria. The author appreciates their contribution greatly for without it the report would not be the same. Their comments were communicated by internet and in the country in September 2015.

The results of the report were presented during a number of consultations to Church leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in (Northern) Nigeria at all levels. The author thanks these Church leaders for their appreciation, comments and recommendations. The consultations were held in September and December 2015.

This report has been drafted by Open Doors International (ODI). The findings have been presented on various meetings with senior church leaders in various parts of Northern Nigeria. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) fully endorses the content of the report and wants the Church and international policy makers to take action to provide security for Christians in Northern Nigeria as well as safeguard their federal rights in the religious, political, economic and social domain of society.

At last Open Doors International thanks local Christians in Nigeria who participated in and contributed to the research, as well as staff of Open Doors International.

This report is a summary of the research report 'Crushed but not defeated, the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Open Doors International, by Arne Mulders, research manager for West Africa.

Disclaimers

The choice of the names of actors of persistent violence (i.e. northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups and Muslim Fulani herdsmen), and drivers of persistent violence (i.e. Northern Muslim endangered interests, Muslims' endangered identity, and Islam's endangered 'legitimate' position) is to accommodate the controversy regarding the identity of those allegedly involved in persistent violence, in both formal and informal reports. However, it is not intended to target one particular socio-religious or ethnic group.

The report is based upon mainly field and media research among Christians and as a consequence the Muslims mind is mostly presumed and interpreted by Christian victims, those interviewed and from the views of scholars. For the purpose of the report this is sufficient as the research aims to present data about the impact of persistent violence on the Church. But for a good balance of knowledge, further research is necessary on the targeted Muslim groups as the perpetrators of violence on Northern Christians so that the Muslim mind could also be captured and a comparative analysis of both the Christian mind and Muslim mind can be made.

Although Christians as a minority are targeted by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria, some Christians however have also brought conflict upon themselves through their own tribalism, political agenda, hatred, retaliation and violence. Other Christians have not always responded well to conflict and violence. Muslims have sometimes reacted violently towards Christians following violent acts of people who were believed to be Christians. Muslims sometimes react because they feel marginalized (e.g. Plateau State in which they are considered non-indigenes with all implications).

Names not published for security reasons: For security reasons, the names of those interviewed cannot be published in this report. The interviews were conducted with different categories of Christians considered as church leaders, scientists, and victims in Northern Nigeria. There was no distinction in gender, class, ethnicity or political affiliation.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
Acknowledgement	6
Disclaimers	6
1 INTRODUCTION	9
2 PERSISTENT VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA	11
2.1 The context within which persistent violence occurs in Northern Nigeria	11
2.1.1 The socio-political reality	11
2.1.2 The religious reality	12
2.2 Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria	12
2.2.1 Northern Muslim political and religious elite	12
2.2.2 Radical Islamic groups	13
2.2.3 The Muslim Fulani herdsmen	13
2.2.4 The Culture of political violence	14
2.3 Examples of Persistent Violence	15
2.3.1 Lassa	15
2.3.2 Potiskum	15
2.3.3 Wukari	16
2.3.4 Tudun Wada Dankadai	16
2.3.5 Tafawa Balewa	16
2.3.6 Jos	17
2.4 Conclusions	17
3 IMPACT ON THE CHURCH: FIGURES, FEATURES AND TRENDS	18
3.1 Figures concerning the impact	18
3.1.1 Christians killed	19
3.1.2 Christians displaced and churches destroyed	22
3.2 Trends in Muslim dominance	23
3.3 Conclusions	25

4 IMPACT ON THE CHURCH: CHURCH LIFE AND PERSONAL LIFE	26
4.1 Church Life	26
4.2 Personal Life	27
4.2.1 Christian Attitudes to Muslims	27
4.2.2 Behaviour of Christians	28
4.2.3 Spiritual and emotional well-being of Christians	30
4.2.4 Challenges for Christians	30
4.3 Conclusions	31
5 RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES	32
5.1 Current strategies and perspectives	32
5.2 Mid to long term strategies and perspectives	32
5.3 Approaches offering vision and strategy for the future	34
5.3.1 The dialogue, peace and reconciliation approach	34
5.3.2 The contextualized approach	35
5.3.3 The peace and justice approach	35
5.3.4 The communal approach	35
5.4 Conclusions	35
6 CONCLUSIONS	36
6.1 Context of the Church in Northern Nigeria	36
6.2 Impact on the Church	36
6.3 Scenarios	37
6.4 Recommendations	37
AFTERWORD	38
APPENDIXES	
Appendix 1 - Methodology	39
Appendix 2 - Nigerian Tribes	40
Appendix 3 - A short political history of Nigeria	41
Appendix 4 - The history of the Church in Northern Nigeria	43
NOTES	45

1 Introduction



This report focuses on the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria. The Church in Northern Nigeria is the entirety of the Christian community, the organized church denominations and the individual Christians in this region. With persistent violence, we characterize the apparent ongoing sequence of incidents of violence and with the impact we mean the consequences of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria.

By mid-2014, it became obvious that the Boko Haram insurgency that started around 2009 was having a devastating impact on the Church in Northern Nigeria. The insurgency peaked on August 24, 2014 with the establishment of the Gwoza Caliphate and subsequent large scale violence in the three north-eastern states (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa). People were killed, wounded, and traumatised. Women and girls were raped, kidnapped and/or forced into marriage. The number of people internally displaced and fleeing to neighbouring countries rose dramatically.

Among the victims were many Christians. Attacks on churches, Christian property, homes, shops, schools and clinics caused widespread chaos. Many Christians relocated to safer areas, leaving few left in the troubled areas. As Christian communities dwindled, Muslims, some from neighbouring countries, came to occupy the empty spaces. This happened, for example, in Gwoza caliphate, Plateau and Taraba. In other places, we have seen consistent efforts to buy destroyed property of discouraged Christians at very low prices. As there was no alternative, Christians often felt compelled to sell their property.

Boko Haram however, is not the only perpetrator of violence against the Church in Northern Nigeria. In the Sharia states and other Muslim dominated areas, Christians have long been marginalised, discriminated and the victims of often targeted violence by other actors. Many Christians migrate to safer areas leaving the remaining Christian community more vulnerable.

Attacks on Christian farmers in Middle Belt states by Muslim Fulani herdsmen are another source of violence. This violence is driven by economic reasons but the political and religious objectives cannot be overlooked.

Persistent violence in Northern Nigeria is a much larger phenomenon and has more causes than commonly perceived. And the negative impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria is also more profound than many think. This impact study based upon field research has been done to gain better insight for policy makers in churches, government and society in Nigeria. The international community has to know about the scope of this violence and its negative impact in order to respond in a proper way to end the violence, restore the situation to normality and deal with the negative consequences for Christian communities as well as intercommunal relationships. This report is the result of the study about the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria.

The problem statement is: What violence has the Church in Northern Nigeria been facing since the year 2000 (implementation of enhanced Sharia in twelve northern states and subsequent religious conflicts)? How has this violence affected the Church in its community life, organization, and personal situation of its members? And what can be done to end the violence and re-establish the Church in Northern Nigeria?

Research questions were:

- What is Northern Nigeria?
- What is the history of the Church in Northern Nigeria?
- What are the actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria?
- What is the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria?
- What are the responses and perspectives of the Church to the impact of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria?
- And what can be done to strengthen the Church in Northern Nigeria in view of the impact of persistent violence?

The **research methodology** (Appendix 1) included media research and academic reports, in-depth interviews with specialists, structured interviews with individual Christians (Appendix 2) and focus group discussions with church leaders and members in Northern Nigeria. Analysis, summary and drawing of final conclusions and recommendations were done by Open Doors International.

In chapter 2, we look at the **historical developments** in what is currently called Northern Nigeria. It is important to understand the political history of the area as it very much influences modern day politics and developments. The chapter also deals with a number of actors in and examples of the persistent violence.

Chapter 3 deals with the challenging issue of **figures, features and trends** that reveal the impact of persistent violence on the Christian community in Northern Nigeria. This section includes figures about the affected populations, Christians and churches through Boko Haram violence, Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks and the dominance in society of the Northern political and religious elite.

In chapter 4, we also look at the **impact of the persistent violence on aspects of Christian living**: Church life, attitudes, behaviour of Christians, spiritual and emotional wellbeing of Christians and the challenges Christians are facing.

Finally, in chapter 5, we assess different **strategic approaches** put forward by various scholars, offering short and long term solutions to the problem of persistent violence against the church in Northern Nigeria that is threatening its very existence in some areas.

2 Persistent Violence in Northern Nigeria?

Chapter 2 deals with the historical developments in what is currently called Northern Nigeria. The history of the area, especially the political history, very much influences modern day politics and developments. It also deals with a number of actors in and examples of the persistent violence.

2.1 The context within which persistent violence occurs in Northern Nigeria

As we see, persistent violence against Christians in Northern Nigeria occurs in a context of several issues, such as religious, political and socio-economic issues. They cannot be separated as totally distinct because they are intertwined in Northern Nigeria. Therefore, we will first picture the context within which persistent violence against Christians occurs in the region.

2.1.1 The socio-political reality

Northern Nigeria is a British colonial construct in which the Muslim Far North and the non-Muslim – now predominant Christian – Middle Belt areas of present Nigeria were united in one common entity by Colonial powers in 1914. This entity was ruled by the British colonial administration who used the already existing governing structures, i.e. the local Muslim Hausa-Fulani emirs, and extended their rule to include large parts of the Middle Belt states, that previously had not been part of the Sokoto Caliphate. (To learn more about the history, see Appendix 4)

Northern Christians wish to live in a free and fair society with equal opportunities for all. However, this is hampered by Northern Muslim dominance.

After independence of Nigeria in 1960, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani remained in power in the northern region and evolved into a Northern political and religious elite that dominated society until the establishment of democracy under Christian president Obasanjo in 1999.

As northern Muslims felt their political, economic and religious dominant position threatened and the Islamic character of their society endangered, enhanced Sharia was implemented in 2000 in twelve Northern states in an effort to prevent this.

Many non-Muslims (who had resisted conversion to Islam for centuries) in Northern Nigeria became Christians in the 20th century through missionary activity. And although their position had not been good under the Sokoto Caliphate and subsequent British colonial rule with its emirate structure, it deteriorated strongly after independence. There were three reasons for this. Firstly, the Muslim Northern political and religious elite extended its influence over society. Secondly, radical Islam appeared after the 1980s. Thirdly, there was a strong deterioration around gubernatorial elections when Muslim Middle Belt politicians instigated Fulani herdsmen attacks in order to remain in power.

Northern Christians wish to live in a free and fair society with equal opportunities for all. However, this is hampered by Northern Muslim dominance.

Nigeria has much tribal diversity. Three main tribal groups make up approximately seventy per cent of the total population. The Hausa-Fulani (twenty-nine per cent) live in the North, the Yoruba in the South-West (twenty-one per cent) and the Igbo in the South-East (eighteen per cent). These three largest tribes dominate politics in the country. In Northern Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani are the largest tribe but they share this region with lots of smaller tribes from the Middle Belt, many of which have no religious affiliation with Islam.

Muslim Hausa-Fulani dominance was challenged when Nigeria returned to democracy with the election of Obasanjo, who is both a Yoruba and Christian, to president in 1999. As a result, other tribes gained access to political power which increased inter-tribal rivalry. With the election of Obasanjo, their domination was contested and rivalry with other tribes (mainly north-south) increased. (See Appendix 3)

2.1.2 The religious reality

The history of the Church in Northern Nigeria can be divided into three periods: the Colonial period from 1857 - 1954, the period of Independent churches from 1954 - 1987 and the period of religious violence from 1987 - present.

The Church in Northern Nigeria has grown from virtually non-existent in 1857, to a number of about 30 million¹ (31.2 per cent) today. It has a large diffusion over the Middle Belt and has made inroads into the North where large numbers of Muslims live.

There are high concentrations of Christians (twenty five to fifty per cent) in seven Northern states. In six Northern States, Christians are in the majority (>fifty per cent).² Christianity in Northern Nigeria is threatened by marginalization, discrimination and targeted violence, but in several places the Church is growing in numbers through a steady influx of new Muslim converts and in spiritual strength through a rise in commitment of church members.³ Christian communities decrease in number in violent-ridden areas of the Far North, but right here Muslim converts do come and remaining Christians become more dedicated to their faith. Christian communities increase in number in relative peaceful areas of the Far North and the Middle Belt, but here the heavy burden of the host communities to materially and financially assist them are felt.

2.2 Actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria

We distinguish three actors of persistent violence in Northern Nigeria, i.e. the Northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups, Fulani herdsman, which are all acting in a culture of political violence.

2.2.1 Northern Muslim political and religious elite

The Northern elite is a merging of two groups. First there are the Hausa-Fulani royal classes that had prominence as emirs in the 19th Century Sokoto Caliphate and as indirect rulers in the British colonial administration in the 20th century. And second there are the Hausa-Fulani politicians of more commoner descent that emerged as a political class after independence in 1960 with the introduction of democracy and elections. The essence of this merging was the preservation of a ruling elite to protect Northern Muslim interests in a united Nigeria. The reason for this was that after independence, access to power and resources was gained at the level of the

federal government in the capital. Here regional interest groups were battling for political power and influence.⁴

The Northern Muslim elite had to deal with three battle fronts: internal Northern Muslim division, the external threat from the non-Muslim, largely Christian population and the invasion right after independence of educated merchants, teachers, and civil servants from the south. In all of these challenges it worked hard and has successfully retained power over a united Northern region.

To defend Northern interests, Muslim identity and the legitimate position of Islam, the Hausa-Fulani elite used instruments and techniques that also impacted the Church and the Christian minority and led to marginalization, discrimination and violent targeting. Examples of these were politically motivated communal clashes, the demands for superior sharia courts in the constitution, and the misuse of political parties, radical Islamic groups and Fulani herdsman. All these efforts were aimed at gaining leverage for their interests. With the return to civil rule and southern Christian Obasanjo winning federal elections in 1999, the Northern Muslim political and religious elite reacted with distress, for their interests were at stake they felt. In response, between 2000 and 2001, twelve Northern states implemented more fully Sharia law, which created a lot of fear amongst Christians and resulted in a major crisis. Enhanced implementation of Sharia led to further marginalization of the Church and the substantial Christian minority in the region.⁵ Obasanjo served his two constitutional terms (1999-2007). However, when Northern Muslims thought their turn had come with Northern president Yar'Adua taking office, Southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan (Vice-President) acceded to power as acting president in 2010, as Yar'Adua died of illness. In the 2011 presidential elections, Goodluck Jonathan was elected president. The northern elite was unhappy with this result which was shown in the 2011 post-electoral crisis that resulted in many Christians being killed, besides some Muslims belonging to the opposition party. Northern politicians are also believed to be behind the Boko Haram uprising to incapacitate the Goodluck regime, and the increase in Muslim Fulani herdsman attacks in Middle Belt states. The formation of the new All Progressive Congress Party with Northern Muslim Muhammadu Buhari as contestor of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 presidential elections has been a successful effort in turning the picture in favour of Northern dominance with Buhari's election in March 2015.

2.2.2 Radical Islamic groups

Radical Islamic groups emerged in the 1980s in Northern Nigeria. They were created by returning Nigerian scholars and students from Arabic countries influenced by Wahhabi and Salafist teaching (every year, thousands of West African Muslims get free scholarships to study in Arab countries). They were also greatly stimulated by the successful Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran (1979). These radical groups emerged in a context of poverty, unemployment and corruption in which the masses had no hope to improve their standards of living. The gap in economic development between the north and the south also played a role. The ideal of a pure form of Islam in which Sharia was applied to society in order to create justice and equal opportunities for all, appealed to the imagination of those outside the privileged Northern elite. When radical leaders emerged with charisma, their following grew rapidly.⁶

The Muslim Fulani herdsmen often clash with the non-Muslim local tribes. Fulani attacks on Christian communities in Middle Belt states have been observed in southern Kaduna, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue and Taraba states.

Historically, there are two reasons for the success of radical Islamic groups. First, there was a desire for a just and equitable society, as poverty, underdevelopment and oppression by the powerful are great vices in Northern Nigeria. Secondly, in Muslim society, when freedom was restricted by military rule, religion became the platform for social and political expression. It was also an outlet for frustration and protests.

Nigeria was under military rule from Muslim northerners from 1979 until 1999. When democracy finally came in 1999, it brought a southern Christian president, to the great dislike of the Northern elite and radical Islamic groups. As a reaction, these two groups collaborated in order to reinstate Muslim domination in the Northern region. The Northern elite have also used radical Islamic groups to influence politics in their favour. Both groups had a common cause but differing views on the desired outcome. The Northern elite want to retain their position in society to protect class interests, while the radical Islamic groups want to change society to create justice and opportunities for all Muslims.

This opposition of interests created clashes behind the scenes, often accompanied by a backlash for the Christian community in Northern Nigeria. For example, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram co-founder and successor of founder Muhammad Yusuf, is a far more radical and violent man than his predecessor and he drastically changed the nature of the sect. Under his rule, not only security forces and government officials were targeted, but also Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders and suspected collaborators. Pushed back by the Nigerian army and security forces in 2009, Boko Haram retreated to its homeland in the forests of the north-east. Apparently supported by (inter)national donors, it started a full blown violent insurgency. In August 2014, the sect declared a Caliphate in north-east Nigeria much like the ones in Syria and Iraq. According to some, Boko Haram had become a political tool for destabilizing the Northern region and the former Nigerian administration of Goodluck Jonathan. The ultimate aim of its manipulators was to force a change in government, especially in the March 2015 elections.⁷ Goodluck Jonathan's ineffectiveness in dealing with Boko Haram was an important reason for his defeat, resulting in the election of a Muslim president. Nevertheless, Boko Haram continued to fight because their main goal is a purely Islamic state and government.

2.2.3 The Muslim Fulani herdsmen

Through the centuries, there has been antagonism between farmers and herders over the limited grazing ground for herds in Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria, the herdsmen are nomadic Muslim Fulani who roam with their cattle in search of pasture and water. Increasing desertification⁸ has led them gradually southwards resulting in more conflict with the non-Muslim farmers in mainly Middle Belt states.

The Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen generally do not respect the boundaries of farm lands and often clash with the non-Muslim local tribes. Many of these local tribes have resisted Islam for centuries and became Christian through missionary activity in the 20th century. So the clashes over land have taken on religious and political overtones, particularly as presidential elections approach. Politicians often pull strings behind the scenes.

Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in Middle Belt states have been observed in southern Kaduna, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue and Taraba states. Here the local farmer from indigenous tribes who are mostly Christian, clash with the migrating Muslim Fulani herdsmen about grazing land. These clashes

have intensified since 2011, especially towards the approaching 2015 presidential elections. The results are that many people have been killed, injured and lots of houses destroyed. Witness reports indicate that the Fulani want dominance in order to take land, property and ultimately eliminate the Christian presence.⁹

A case study in Taraba State supports this even more clearly. It indicates that ‘there is a sophisticated and systematic attack on Christians in Taraba state’ by Fulani herdsmen. The study also suggests that apart from land and cattle grazing issues, the persistent violence of Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in Taraba State is also connected ‘to the historical migration of Muslims into non-Muslim territories in northern Nigeria to promote the Islamic religious and missionary agenda in Islamizing all parts of northern Nigeria’. And finally the study states that Fulani herdsmen attacks are used by the Muslim political and religious elite in the state together with other means to dominate land owned by Christians in Taraba state.¹⁰

2.2.4 The culture of political violence

Human Rights Watch identifies a culture of political violence in Nigeria characterized by: systemic violence by politicians and other political elites that undercut freedom and security; corruption that accompanies this political violence and impunity for most involved. The mentality of this culture of violence is survival of the fittest, with the fittest mostly exempt from the rule of law. As an apparent long term effect of Nigeria’s military rule, the violence has become endemic. Combined with widespread bad governance, weak state institutions and a failing electoral system, competition for political power went to the streets where gangs and thugs, recruited by politicians, help secure victory over adversaries. Street

fighting, attacks on political headquarters or homes of politicians, intimidation of voters and rigging of election outcomes took place. In many cases, gangland “godfathers” took control over politicians who needed their financial support and gangs for battle. In turn, these godfathers were given government institutions as prizes. Formal investigation and prosecution of these people and practices pose a severe challenge as governing politicians protect the system of corruption and prevent change because they owe their position to it.¹¹


An example is the use of ‘Kalare Boys’ in Gombe state. They are unemployed youth with little chance for a better future. They form loosely organized gangs and turn to violent crime for a living. They are easily recruited by politicians with money, alcohol, drugs and weapons, to intimidate and attack opponents or to protect the politician that recruited them. The Kalare Boys are said to have played an important role in winning 2003 and 2007 gubernatorial elections on behalf of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

More reports are being heard about the influx of impoverished Muslim nationals from neighboring countries who are recruited for jihad purposes. Local politicians, Boko Haram and other radical Islamic sects are reportedly recruiting child soldiers from e.g. Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Unemployed Muslim youth who feel hopeless in their own countries sometimes join well-trained Muslim fighters from the same countries. As there are no wages to be paid, their reward is booty - women, property and land. For example, those who support the Fulani herdsmen have taken over the farmland of the original Christian population and the kidnapping of Christian school girls to marry them off to Muslim men.

Christian victim of persistent and sophisticated violence from Muslim Fulani herdsmen, such as in Taraba State. Such attacks leave Christians killed, injured and houses destroyed.



NORTHERN NIGERIA AND HIGHLIGHTED TOWNS IMPACTED BY VIOLENCE



2.3 Examples of Persistent Violence

Persistent violence against the Church in Northern Nigeria appears to have certain features. We will identify them by highlighting the impact on six towns, i.e Lassa, Postiskum, Wukari, Tudun Wada Dankadai, Tafawa Balewa and Jos.

2.3.1 Lassa

Lassa is situated in southern Borno State. Although some Hausa-Fulani migrants settled for commercial reasons, the town and its surrounds are inhabited by the Margi tribe. The Marghi were governed by their traditional chieftains and Islam had little influence. In the 19th century, when missionaries from the Church of the Brethren in Nigeria (EYN) entered into and evangelized Nigeria, many Margi converted to the Christian faith.

With independence in 1960, however, Muslims started to dominate Borno State government, extended their influence over southern Borno and slowly the educational, legal and political systems were islamised. Christians faced discrimination at all levels: government, university, healthcare and infrastructure. As a result, some Margi became Muslim, but many Christians moved out of southern Borno.

Boko Haram violence reached Lassa in 2012, targeting churches, missions, schools and police stations. First Christians and government personnel were targeted. Later everyone unwilling to cooperate was attacked. People left the town and villages and hid in the forests.

Lassa has been conquered like nearby cities Chibok, Gulak and Magdagali. In August 2014, Boko Haram erected its Caliphate in nearby Gwoza and large areas of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe were incorporated.

The EYN Church is committed to do the only thing they feel they can do: to pray for and help the victims. The church in the region is greatly impacted by the violence. Thirty-six of the fifty church districts¹² are closed, 1,359 churches are closed, 356 pastors, 346 assistant pastors and 1,390 evangelists have become unemployed, and many Christians fled abroad or relocated to safer areas.

2.3.2 Potiskum

Potiskum, in southern Yobe state, was severely affected by the 2011 post-electoral crisis and subsequent Boko Haram insurgency. Southern Yobe Christians constituted and estimated fifteen per cent in 2011 but have reduced now to about 3.5 per cent of the population. Half of the churches (80) have been closed, attendance has dramatically decreased (up to 75 per cent) and many Christians have fled to other states.

The history of southern Yobe and Potiskum tells us that southern Yobe was never part of the Kanem-Borno Empire or conquered by the Hausa-Fulani jihad. A hundred years ago, Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) missionaries brought the gospel and the Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA) church was established. After independence, Muslims dominated Yobe state government and institutions resulting in Christians

being further marginalized and discriminated against in education, politics and employment, Sharia is applied. As a result, churches cannot officially be established, rebuilt or repaired and freedom of worship is very limited. Most activities of the church have to take place 'underground' as pastors and worship services are targeted by Boko Haram as well as parts of the local Muslim population. Moreover, Christian families have become separated because mothers and children needed to be relocated to safer places (i.e. Jos, Plateau State). Yobe Christians that are remaining have become a traumatized community.¹³

2.3.3 Wukari

Wukari town, in Wukari local government area, in southern Taraba state, has a population of over 50,000. It is estimated that thirty-five per cent are Muslims, 45 per cent are Christians and that twenty per cent adhere to traditional religion. The population is mainly Yukon, Tiv and Christian. Most Muslims are Hausa-Fulani who have settled during the last sixty years.

Since 2010, southern Taraba has suffered violence through Fulani herdsmen attacks in rural areas and communal violence in towns like Wukari. According to Christians in Taraba state, Muslims have always sought political power and land, and in order to realize this, they incite violence. There were crises in 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014. During the 2014 crisis, around one-hundred churches were destroyed and around two-hundred churches abandoned in southern Taraba. After three days of fighting in Wukari town, approximately fifty people were killed and 101 wounded.

Violence in southern Taraba is politically motivated as a case study shows.¹⁴ Taraba State was created in 1991 and there is an agreement to rotate governorship between the three existing northern, central and southern senatorial zones. The northern zone had its turn before 2011 and its governors were Christians. The central zone had its turn in 2011 and a Christian governor was elected. When the latter was severely wounded in a plane accident, however, his Muslim deputy became acting governor. When the 2015 gubernatorial elections were approaching, the acting Muslim governor wanted to stay in power and incited religious violence to destabilize the south so it will be unable to present its Christian candidate and assume gubernatorial responsibilities. He was however defeated by a Christian candidate in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) internal elections and this candidate won the 2015 elections and took his place as next governor of Taraba State. The position

of this Christian governor however is contested as an elections tribunal in a ruling annulled his winning due to irregularities in the PDP internal elections. The Muslim woman candidate of the opposition All Peoples Congress party (APC), the party of president Buhari, is appointed as winner. The Christian president will contest the ruling of the elections tribunal.

2.3.4 Tudun Wada Dankadai

Tudun Wada Dankadai is a city situated in Kano state. Of the nine million inhabitants of Kano state, about one million are indigene Christians. In the 2007 local Muhammed drawing crisis, Christian students of a secondary school were accused of drawing an offensive drawing. All Christian students were attacked and expelled. Subsequent attacks targeted eight churches in town. These were burnt to the ground and their members were forced to flee. Besides some southern Christian police and business men, no indigenous Hausa Christians remained in the city. The Christian minorities in the villages around Tudun Wada Dankadai are severely marginalized. Christians are not allowed to buy land or build churches on native land. All mission schools and hospitals have been taken by the government and Christian children do not receive scholarships for studies. Christian girls are regularly abducted and forced into marrying Muslim men.

Christian businesses are closed down and Christians are hardly hired as government workers. Christian youth have to be either home-schooled, or change their names to Muslim names in order to be allowed entry to government schools or relocate to schools in the Middle Belt. As a result, many Kano Christians migrate to the Middle Belt.

2.3.5 Tafawa Balewa

Tafawa Balewa is one of the three Christian dominated Local Government Areas (LGA) in southern Bauchi state. Tafawa Balewa town is its capital. In 2012, Bauchi State House Assembly decided to relocate the headquarters to Bununu, a Muslim village next to Tafawa Balewa town. A Christian representative in the Assembly protested this decision and was immediately suspended. The High Court of Bauchi state resolved in her favour but the case was appealed by her opponents to the Federal Supreme Court. In the meantime her suspension remains.

Tafawa Balewa is rich in natural resources (e.g. minerals, precious stones) Christians believe the Muslims want to access the resources. Since 1991, Tafawa Balewa has

been under repeated attack by its Muslim neighbours. Christians defend themselves through youth vigilante groups who battle with stones and traditional weapons. Some of them have been caught and imprisoned by police. The two secondary schools in Tafawa Balewa town have been closed.

The boys now have no education and the girls need to travel to the nearest school. On the road, however, they risk being kidnapped and forced into a Muslim marriage or raped and killed. The churches are poor and have no defenses. Due to the hopeless and violent situation, many Christians relocate to nearby Jos leaving the remaining Christians even more vulnerable.

2.3.6 Jos

Jos city in Plateau state experienced several crises between 1994 and 2012. Fulani herdsmen attacked Christian villages in rural areas south of Jos. The indigenous Berom, Anaguta and Afriwere (BAA) communities clashed with the Hausa-Fulani settler group in Jos. Thousands of Muslims and Christians were killed, wounded and displaced. Public property was destroyed, mosques, churches and schools attacked, cattle stolen and complete villages ransacked. These clashes were primarily about access to political power, economic resources and land but were also widely viewed as religiously motivated. The main problem is the indigene/settler dispute, in which indigenes to the state have preferential opportunities over the settlers. Indigenous Christian BAA in this conflict are the antagonists of Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers.

During colonial times, the BAA were marginalized through indirect rule put in the hands of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani. During independence successive military regimes extended Hausa-Fulani control over the larger Plateau province. With the start of democracy in 1999 and the creation of Plateau State itself, the BAA finally got access to power through their majority numbers. At that point, the Hausa-Fulani felt marginalized and discriminated against. The focus is on Jos city, capital of Plateau State and center of power and business. Control of the city is control over the state. If Muslim Hausa-Fulani gain political control of Jos city, this would pose a threat to the Christian BAA groups. For from their perspective and their experience, the Fulani will then eventually also have full control of Plateau State. This threat transcends the local dimensions of Plateau State as Muslim Hausa-Fulani in power historically (Sokoto Caliphate) and actually (Sharia states) marginalize, discriminate against

and persecute non-Muslims of whom the majority presently is Christian.¹⁵ This is the core of the feeling of Christians in Jos being targeted by the larger Muslim community in Northern Nigeria.

2.4 Conclusions

Northern Nigeria is a British colonial construction in which the Muslim north and the non-Muslim – now predominantly Christian – Middle Belt areas of present Nigeria were united in one common entity. The non-Muslim population in the northern region (mainly Middle Belt states) wants freedom from Hausa-Fulani domination (e.g. Plateau State). But this is difficult to get as the holders of power in the northern region – the Muslim political and religious elite – want the region to remain undivided under its domination.

The actors of persistent violence impacting the Church in Northern Nigeria are:

1. the northern Muslim political and religious elite
2. radical Islamic groups
3. Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen


Drivers of violence can be summarized as follows:

1. Protection of Northern endangered interests (political-economic)
2. Protection of Muslims' endangered identity (social-cultural)
3. Protection of Islam's endangered 'legitimate' position (religious)

Christians are the most targeted religious group in Northern Nigeria for these three specific reasons. Christianity in Northern Nigeria is a minority in a Muslim context, but a sizable one (over 30 million, constituting 31.2 per cent of the population). There are high concentrations of Christians (25-50 per cent) in seven Northern states.

In six Northern states Christians are in the majority (>50 per cent). And in 158 out of the 417 Local Government Areas (LGA)¹⁶ Christians are in the majority (> 50 per cent). Christian existence in Northern Nigeria is under threat due to persistent violence, and in certain areas has become virtually extinct. At the same time, the number of church members in other areas is increasing because of Christians relocating and also because of Muslims converting to Christianity.

3 Impact on the Church: figures, features and trends



This chapter will show features, trends and conclusions about the impact of the persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria.

3.1 Figures concerning the impact

Christians form a substantial minority in Northern Nigeria (an estimated 30,666,000 = 31.2 per cent) and is the most targeted group for different reasons (biggest minority, exponential church growth, ethnic composition and association with the West).

Table 1. Religious adherence in Northern Nigeria per 2014¹⁷

Religious adherence	Numbers and percentages
Christians ¹⁸	30,666,000 (31.2%)
Muslims	62,431,000 (63.5%)
African Traditional Religionists ¹⁹	7,377,000 (7.5%)
Total northern population	98,366,000 (53.6%)

Christians live in all nineteen Northern states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja and form majorities in six states, being: Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba.

Table 2. Percentage of Christians per Northern state per 2014²⁰

State	Percentage of Christians
Adamawa	53.6%
Bauchi	25.3%
Benue	81.0%
Borno	30.0%
Gombe	40.0%
Jigawa	7.0%
Kaduna	46.7%
Kano	8.3%
Katsina	9.0%
Kebbi	24.0%
Kogi	51.3%
Kwara	41.7%
Nasarawa	51.7%
Niger	39.0%
Plateau	73.3%
Sokoto	4.3%
Taraba	50.0%
Yobe	6.7%
Zamfara	2.3%
FCT Abuja	43.3%

Some question whether Christians are victims of persistent violence 'by targeting' and say they are victim 'at random'. With violence 'at random', Christians are victims like anyone else in society, but with violence 'by targeting', Christians are singled out and their group identity as Christians is at stake.

When Christians are killed 'at random' we can apply the demographic percentage of Christians in Northern Nigeria, which is 31.2 per cent, to the total number of deaths. But if Christians are targeted, we argue that the percentage of Christian deaths can be ten per cent higher and get to 41.2 per cent of the total number of deaths. This argumentation is based upon the observation that Boko Haram - largely responsible for the total number of deaths - also started to target Christian churches and property in the later years of their campaign of violence. Research about the violence in the short period of November and December 2014, at the peak of the Gwoza Caliphate, stated that 43.5 per cent of the victims were Christians.

Next to that we know that most of the victims of the Muslim Hausa Fulani herdsmen attacks in the Middle Belt states are Christians. For this violence a conservative estimate of seventy per cent of the deaths can be considered to be Christians.

It is therefore plausible to work with a 'targeted' percentage of 41.2 per cent.

Open Doors International argues that Christians are the most targeted religious group in Northern Nigeria for four reasons they share with Christian minorities worldwide²¹.

They present the probability of being targeted:

1. Christians form the biggest religious minority in a Muslim context and if occasions for marginalization, discrimination and violence exist or appear, Christians statistically bear the brunt.
2. The Christian faith has grown exponentially. Between 1857 and 2014, the Christian faith grew from virtually non-existent to 31.2 per cent of the population due to Christian mission, indigenization of African churches and the Pentecostal movement. Christianity through this growth is seen as a threat to the dominance of Islam in the region.
3. Christians often belong to ethnic, linguistic and cultural minorities. They speak other languages and have different values. The Muslim majority belongs to the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri tribes and tensions with minority tribes easily rise.
4. Christians are associated with the Western secular culture that is seen as alien to Islamic religious culture and arouses resentment. As a consequence, Christians are often objects of vented frustrations towards the West.

Christians are the most targeted religious group in Northern Nigeria for three specific reasons. They present the actual drivers of targeted violence as shown in Chapter 2.2 which deals about the actors of persistent violence.

3.1.1 Christians killed

In the following paragraph, we use the Nigeria Watch (NW) data on non-natural death to estimate the numbers of Christians killed by persistent violence in Northern Nigeria.²²

Between 2006 and 2014, Northern Nigeria was the most unsafe region in the country due to a variety of causes that range from car accidents to political crisis (45,278 people killed). In 2010, the region had over fifty per cent of the deaths in the whole country with a staggering peak of 82.3 per cent in 2014, largely due to the Boko Haram crisis. Although it is difficult to assess the number of Christian death due to targeted violent attacks we make a conservative estimate that 11,500 Christians have been killed in religious, political, and cattle grazing/land issues in the researched period (2006-2014).



Blast wreaks havoc on two churches in Bauchi, Nigeria, June 2012

Table 3. Recorded number of non-natural violent deaths in Northern Nigeria (2006-2014)




Table 4. Comparison between Nigeria and Northern Nigeria's number of non-natural death (2006-2014)

Issue/Area	Nigeria (NG)	%	Northern Nigeria (NN)	% of NG
2006	4,443	100	9,44	21.2
2007	6,520	100	2,612	40.1
2008	5,624	100	1,937	34.4
2009	5,635	100	2,655	47.1
2010	5,799	100	3,011	51.9
2011	6,704	100	3,927	58.6
2012	7,670	100	4,988	65.0
2013	10,854	100	7,629	70.3
2014	21,299	100	17,525	82.3
Totals of non-natural deaths (not double counted)			44,284	

The main reasons for the deaths in Nigeria are political issues, religious issues, crimes and car accidents. But if we compare Northern figures with the whole country a different pattern prevails: 99.7 per cent of the death caused by religious issues (19,572), 85.9 per cent of all deaths caused by political issues (19,623), 82.9 per cent of the deaths caused by cattle grazing (611) and 77.2 per cent of the deaths as a result of land issues (2,190) are all in Northern Nigeria. However, incidents have multiple causes and for that reason there is double counting in the Nigeria Watch numbers for religious, political and cattle grazing/land issues. We will deal with that later.

Table 5. The main causes of violence in Northern Nigeria (2006- 2014) Diagram




Table 6. Comparison between Nigeria and Northern Nigeria in causes of non-natural death (2006-2014)

Issue/Area	Nigeria (NG)	%	Northern Nigeria	% of NG
Car accidents	16,112	100	7,271	45.1
Cattle grazing	737	100	611	82.9
Convict executions	21	100	1	0.04
Crimes	32,001	100	18,005	56.3
Fire/explosion	10,124	100	5,416	53.5
Land issues	3,258	100	2,190	77.2
Market issues	427	100	67	15.7
Natural disaster	1,833	100	1,014	55.3
Oil distribution	4,677	100	792	17.0
Oil production	1,555	100	0	0.0
Other accidents	4,342	100	1,681	38.7
Political issues	22,852	100	19,623	85.9
Religious issues	19,637	100	19,572	99.7
Sorcery	726	100	230	31.7
Totals of non-natural deaths by causes of violence (possibly double counted)			76,473	

These figures on causes of death in Northern Nigeria reveal how the Church has been impacted by three specific types of violence:

1. Religious issues (99.7 per cent)

Religious causes are where players are religious organizations - churches or Islamic groups – and advocate a religious agenda.

Main examples are:

- The 2000 Sharia crisis in Kaduna State; Christians protested to the implementation of more full Sharia law by the state government. Muslim counter protests led to violent clashes with Christians.
- The Boko Haram insurgency since 2009; Security forces clamped down on the movement in the same year and killed many members among which founder Muhammad Yusuf. The insurgency was Boko Haram's reaction to this.
- The 2000 till 2012 communal riots in Jos, Plateau state; Muslim and Christian communities clashed about the results of local elections and property of land.

2. Political issues (85.9 per cent)

Main examples are:

- the 2008 local election violence erupted after the results of local elections were contested by the Muslim Hausa Fulani.
- the 2011 post-electoral crisis; southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan won the 2011 presidential elections in detriment of northern Muslim Muhammad Buhari. Frustration of northern Muslims led to clashes in the northern region with supposed Jonathan voters, mainly Christians.
- the 2013 emergency rule in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states; the reaction of the government to contain the Boko Haram insurgency in mainly the northeast of Nigeria.

3. Cattle grazing (82.9 per cent) and land issues (77.2 per cent)²³

These are struggles between Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen and local farmers about access to grazing grounds and land. This has happened, for example, with Christian communities in the Middle Belt.

We observe that incidents of violence where Christians are targeted by Muslims can be rooted in religion, politics, economics and the social-cultural situation at the same time. Moreover, we argue that these three types of violence are very often intertwined through a common religious denominator (defending Muslims' interests, Muslim identity and Islam's position). So these issues of religion, politics, cattle grazing/land disputes can be placed in a single category of 'religious related violence'.

Table 7. Estimated number of Christians killed by religious related violence in Northern Nigeria (2006-2014)

Category/ numbers	Number of victims	Number of Christian victims (at random) 31.2%	Number of Christian victims (targeted) 41.2%
Religious issues	19,572	6,107	8,064
Political issues	19,623	6,122	8,085
Cattle / land issues	2,801	874	1,154
Totals of non- natural deaths by causes of religious related violence	41,996 (possibly double counted)		

Estimation of Christians killed by targeting

To get a credible estimation of the numbers of Christians killed, however, we argue as follows. According to a June 2015 estimation of Amnesty International²⁴ 17,000 people have been killed since 2009 by Boko Haram. OCHA²⁵ estimates 9,300 to be the number of people killed since 2009 by Boko Haram alone. Only Human Rights Watch²⁶ in its May 2015 estimations speaks about the different causes of sectarian, Communal and political violence – our category of religious related violence – and comes up with a total figure of 20,000 deaths since 1999.

As the Nigeria Watch figures are more comprehensive and take into account multiple causes, we base our estimations upon their data. We start with the figures for non-natural deaths by causes of violence (possibly double counted). If we add various causes of religious related we get to the percentage of 59.2 per cent. In this percentage, there is still a possibility of double count.

If we apply this percentage to the absolute number of deaths of 44,284, then we get to the number of 26,216 people killed as a result of religious related violence.

To come up with the number of Christians killed 'at random', we then need to apply the demographic percentage of 31.2 to the number of 26,216. This leads to the following number of Christians killed 'at random' in Northern Nigeria: 8,179. This percentage is a minimum percentage.

Subsequently, a demographic percentage of 41.2 per cent needs to be taken to calculate the number of Christians killed 'by targeting'. This leads to the following number of Christians killed 'by targeting' in Northern Nigeria: 10,801.

Table 8. Number of Christians killed by religious related violence in Northern Nigeria (2006 – 2014)

Number of non-natural death (possibly double counted)	Numbers
Totals of non-natural deaths by causes of violence <i>(Cf. Table 6. Totals Northern Nigeria)</i>	76,473 (100%)
Totals of non-natural deaths by causes of religious related violence <i>(Cf. Table 7. Totals Number of victims)</i>	41,996 (59.2%)
Conclusion: 59.2% of the non-natural death possibly double counted are by religious related violence	
Number of non-natural deaths (without possible double count)	Numbers
Totals of non-natural deaths <i>(Cf. Table 4. Totals Northern Nigeria)</i>	44,284 (100%)
59.2% of these non-natural deaths are by religious related violence	26,216 (59.2%)
Estimated number of Christians killed by religious related violence (taken from the number of 26,216)	Numbers
Christians killed 'at random' among these non-natural deaths by religious related violence are:	8,179 (31.2%)
Christians killed 'by targeting' among these non-natural deaths by religious related violence are:	10,801 (41.2%)

Estimated number of Christians killed by targeting due to religious related violence (2006-2014): 11,500

But as the Nigeria Watch figures for cattle grazing/land issues are too low due to insufficient recording and the percentage for Christians targeted by Fulani herdsmen related violence is a conservative seventy per cent, our final estimations are slightly higher as we estimate in round figures that between **9,000 and 11,500 Christians have been killed in religious related violence in Northern Nigeria.**

3.1.2 Christians displaced and churches destroyed

In March 2015, according to the United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 1,235,295 people in total were displaced in Northern Nigeria. Ninety-two per cent (1,136,470) of them are displaced by Boko Haram related violence and the remaining eight per cent (98,824) of them are mainly displaced by Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen attacks.²⁷

If we apply the percentage 'by targeting', 468,266 Christians in Northern Nigeria are displaced due to Boko Haram related violence and 40,716 due to violence by Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen (statistics from March 2015). However, many more Christians have left Northern Nigeria altogether and have integrated in communities in Middle Belt states or migrated (back) to Southern Nigeria. Based upon the number of destroyed churches²⁸, we estimate that up to 1.3 million Christians have left their place of residence between 2000 and 2014. The Christian communities in the Far North (e.g. Borno -87.3 per cent, Yobe -77.8 per cent and Kano -63.4 per cent) have the most Christians that flee. While Christian communities in the Middle Belt (e.g. Benue +forty per cent, Plateau +75.6 per cent, Nasarawa +44 per cent and Benue +forty per cent) receive the most fleeing Christians. Between 2000 and 2014, over 13,000 churches have been abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt, predominantly in the Far North. We estimate that this has affected 1.3 million Christians. Amongst them, there are internally displaced persons, people that have been forced to relocate and people who are no longer able to go to their normal place of worship. Nearly 3,500 new churches have been established by relocating Christians, predominantly in Middle Belt states.

Table 9. Estimated number of Christians displaced by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen attacks (per March 2015)

Category/ numbers	Number of displaced	Number of displaced Christians 'at random' 31.2 per cent	Number of displaced Christians 'by targeting' 41.2 per cent
Boko Haram related violence	1,136,470	354,579	468,226
Mainly Fulani herdsmen attacks and some by natural disaster	98,824	30,833	40,716
Total	1,235,294	385,412	508,942

The impact on Christian communities in Northern states between 2000 and 2014 is shown in table 10. The rise and fall in numbers over the years is essentially due to the displacement and relocation of Christians to different states.

March 2015, an estimated 468,226 Christians in Northern Nigeria were displaced by Boko Haram related violence and 40,716 Christians were displaced mainly by Fulani herdsmen attacks. The Christian communities in northern Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states are the most affected by Boko Haram violence. The Christian community in Nasarawa State was the most affected by Fulani herdsmen attacks. Christians apparently relocate to Middle Belt states (e.g. Plateau, Kogi, Kwara) and relative peaceful Sharia states (e.g. Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara).

Table 10: Affected congregations in per Northern state²⁹

State/ church	Total number congregations in 5 CAN ³⁰ groups in 2000	Total number congregations in 5 CAN groups in 2014	Increase / decrease between 2000 and 2014	Percentage
Adamawa	12,308	8,410	-3,898	-31.7
Bauchi	4,111	3,508	-603	-14.7
Benue	10,900	10,790	-110	-1.0
Borno	6,210	890	-5,320	-85.7
FCT Abuja	560	671	111	19.8
Gombe	4,853	4,745	-108	-2.2
Jigawa	405	338	-67	-16.5
Kaduna	21,600	19,912	-1,688	-7.8
Kano	2,530	2,312	-218	-5.5
Katsina	4,530	5,525	995	23.6
Kebbi	3,625	3,853	228	6.2
Kogi	8,296	8,718	422	5.1
Kwara	8,496	9,022	526	6.2
Nasarawa	3,227	2,481	-746	-23.1
Niger	4,165	4,219	54	1.3
Plateau	18,315	19,420	1,105	6.0
Sokoto	660	682	22	3.3
Taraba	4,196	4,014	-182	-4.3
Yobe	246	52	-194	-78.7
Zamfara	204	228	24	11.8
Totals	119,437	109,790	-13,067	-10.9
			/ +3,487	/ +2.9

3.2 Trends in Muslim control in society

In the Christian experience there are three trends in Muslim control in society in Northern Nigeria. Muslims have the upper hand in politics, in economics and in media.

Muslim participation in politics is traditionally strong in Africa owing to their belief that religion and state (ar. din wa dawla) are one and undivided. With the heritage of the Sokoto Caliphate and British indirect rule, the northern political and religious elite have strengthened their hold over the political structures of the northern region following independence. Although six northern states have a Christian majority, only three have a Christian governor. Moreover, although six other Northern states (plus FCT (Federal Capital Territory) Abuja) have substantial Christian minorities (25-50 per cent), only four have a Christian deputy governor.

Table 11. Christian and Muslim state (deputy) governors (2015 - 2019)³¹

State	Percentage of Christians	State Governor	Deputy State Governor
Adamawa	53.6%	Muslim	Christian
Bauchi	25.3%	Muslim	Muslim
Benue	81.0%	Christian	Christian
Borno	30.0%	Muslim	Muslim
Gombe	40.0%	Muslim	Christian
Jigawa	7.0%	Muslim	Muslim
Kaduna	46.7%	Muslim	Christian
Kano	8.3%	Muslim	Muslim
Katsina	9.0%	Muslim	Muslim
Kebbi	24.0%	Muslim	Muslim
Kogi	51.3%	Muslim	Christian
Kwara	41.7%	Muslim	Christian
Nasarawa	51.7%	Muslim	Christian
Niger	39.0%	Muslim	Muslim
Plateau	73.3%	Christian	Christian
Sokoto	4.3%	Muslim	Muslim
Taraba	50.0%	Christian	Muslim
Yobe	6.7%	Muslim	Muslim
Zamfara	2.3%	Muslim	Muslim

As far as economics are concerned, Muslims in Nigeria have a great track record. Following the prophet of Islam who was a businessman, Muslims travelled along the trans-Saharan trade routes and developed excellent skills in commerce. Within the Sokoto Caliphate and under British indirect rule, Muslim business grew and extended throughout the Northern region, dominating city markets, petty trade, food production, etc. Christians, mainly agricultural farmers and civil servants, did not engage in business and developed a certain dependency of Muslims in this regard.

Northern Muslims are also strongly represented in the media. Examples are the New Nigerian Newspapers Ltd. (NNN) and the Federal Radio Corporation in Kaduna (FRCK). Through these media outlets, Northern Muslim interests are put on the agenda at a federal and state level and they are well developed. As the FRCK became the recruiting ground for BBC Hausa services and Voice of America Hausa services, Muslim domination became extended to the important media houses in Northern Nigeria and through this the presentation of realities on the ground. Christians feel their cause to be neglected as the Muslim perspective is represented.

In 2014, the BBC-Hausa Service Staff in the London office numbered 37, all of them Muslim. News reporting in the Northern region through BBC remains virtually entirely in Muslim hands. Similarly, of the Voice of America-Hausa service staff in the Washington office, seventeen out of twenty-three are Muslim. News reporting in the Northern region through Voice of America seventy per cent is in Muslim hands. There are qualified Hausa Christian journalists but for one reason or another they are not part of the staff.

Table 12. Staff of important media houses in Northern Nigeria (per August 2014)³²

Media house ^{xxviii}	Muslims	Christians	Total
BBC Hausa Service staff	37 (100%)	Nil	37
Voice of America Hausa Service staff	17 (70%)	7	23

Analyzing the results of our research, we can observe the following features that indicate a growth in the control over society of Muslims in Northern Nigeria over the years. In this growth, six distinctive features can be observed that have great impact upon the Church in Northern Nigeria in terms of marginalization, discrimination and violence:

- 1. The phenomenon of organized violence**
(e.g. the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, the Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the Middle Belt, the Jos Plateau communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis)
- 2. The alliance of religion and politics**
(e.g. the protection of the interests of the northern Muslim religious and political elite, the application of Sharia in twelve northern states, the Hausa-Fulani in power in southern Kaduna local governments, the political manipulation in the Wukari, Taraba State communal clashes and the Fulani herdsmen attacks on Christian communities in the southern senatorial district of Taraba State)
- 3. The ongoing influx of Muslims through migration**
(the migration of Muslim Fulani to Middle Belt states for land and cattle reasons, the relocation of Muslim inhabitants from the Far North to the Middle Belt due to desertification and draughts, the settling of foreign mercenary jihadists in the property and lands left behind by fleeing Christians in Taraba State)

- 4. The constant pressure to convert to Islam**
(e.g. Hausa Christians being considered as settlers in Sharia states – if you convert to Islam, you are considered to be indigene with access to land and political rights. Moreover, in all of Northern Nigeria, both in the Sharia states and the Middle Belt, there is discrimination against Christians in terms of access to promotion, jobs, scholarships, in terms of being awarded school notes, having access to doctors, clinics and hospitals of the government; the suppression of teaching in Christian Religious Knowledge at many government schools; the dominance of Muslims in northern politics, economics, culture and the media leading to the squeeze of becoming Muslim in order to be able to marry a beautiful lady, to get nice employment and/or a substantial loan from the banks; the mosques and Islamic schools not destroyed in Boko Haram conquered territory in the northeast. All of this considered, this leads to pressure to convert to Islam in order to get access to basic civil rights, social services, education, jobs and such.)
- 5. The combination of Hausa culture and Islam**
(e.g. Hausa being the dominant culture which is greatly influenced by Islam. Hausa Christians are a minority. The use of Hausa as a lingua franca in the northern region, the adoption of Hausa names by Christians to prevent being identified as Christian and subsequently marginalized and discriminated against in society, kidnapping of young Christian girls and subsequent forced 'Hausaization' and Islamization, capture of mission schools in the 1970s by northern state governments and subsequent de-Christianization)
- 6. The promotion of Islam as a religion that brings success**
(e.g. the effective 20-year Muslim rule in the period between the Christian President Obasanjo's first and second government (1 October 1999 – 29 May 2007), the manipulation of the Christian constituency for Muslim political ends during democracy, the failure of the Christian Goodluck administration to beat Boko Haram, the economic effectiveness of northern Muslim businessmen, the Hausa domination of retail business in Northern Nigeria, the poverty of many northern Christians in rural areas)³³

The question remains what will be the impact on the future of the Church in Northern Nigeria? Will its fate be the same as the Church in the Middle East where it has seen a steep decline or where in some places it has even ceased to exist in organized form? Or will it stand out and if so, how?

3.3 Conclusions

Christians form a substantial minority in Northern Nigeria and are the most targeted group. In terms of persistent violence, they may well constitute up to 41.2 per cent of the victims. Between 2006 and 2014, Northern Nigeria was the most violent region in the country. In 2010, the northern region had 50 per cent of Nigeria's total deaths, with a staggering peak of 82 per cent in 2014 due to the Boko Haram insurgency. An estimated 11,500 Christians have been killed in targeted religious related violence in this period.

Between 2000 and 2014, up to 1.3 million Christians have left their place of residence and integrated into communities in Middle Belt states or southern Nigeria. In 2015, nearly half a million of them are still displaced by Boko Haram related violence and over 40,000 of them mainly by Fulani herdsmen attacks. The Christian communities in the Far North are the most affected by Christians that flee. The Christian communities in the Middle Belt receive most Christians that relocate. Between 2000 and 2014, over 13,000 churches have been abandoned, closed, destroyed and/or burnt in Northern Nigeria.

Persistent violence against the Church in Northern Nigeria can be defined as marginalization and discrimination by Sharia state governments and Islamic society at large, and by targeted violence by politically motivated communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen attacks. Responses of the Church leadership so far lack coherent vision, strategy and planning to cope with this.

4 Impact on the Church: Church life and personal life

THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS RELATED VIOLENCE ON THE CHURCH IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Church life



66.6%

of the respondents reported a decrease in church activities.

Personal life



1987

Since the Kafanchan crisis, every Christian is born and bred in a culture of violence

Behavior

80%

of Christians say feelings towards Muslims have been negatively affected



Spiritual and emotional well-being



65%

According to of the respondents, personal prayer increased

This chapter deals with the impact of persistent violence on aspects of Christian living: church life, attitudes, behavior of Christians, spiritual and emotional well-being of Christians and the challenges Christians are facing.

4.1 Church Life³⁴

A total of 102 people has been interviewed, representing five Church denominations and 44 congregations in Northern Nigeria.

One third of respondents indicated that Sunday worship attendance and membership had decreased by more than fifty per cent. Another third indicated a decrease by less than fifty per cent. One third indicated that attendance

and membership had increased by more than twenty-five per cent. Attendance and membership decreased in the Far North in violence ridden areas but increased in the Middle Belt states where many Christians relocated to.

According to one third of respondents, attendance to midweek Bible study, prayer meetings, outreach and community projects dropped by fifty per cent or more. Involvement in outreach to Muslims dropped by more than fifty per cent in almost half of all cases. The decrease was due to the fear of violent attacks on the church and a lower level of midweek church security, compared to Sunday when security guards are present. Moreover, Christians are afraid to enter or travel through Muslim areas for fear of targeted violence.

The factors preventing outreach to Muslims are the inaccessibility of Muslim areas, Christian fear and even hatred of Muslims, and the difficulty of obtaining permission for public campaigns from authorities.


The Church has mostly lost the strength and resources to engage in community projects due to poverty among members. Many church congregations, schools and clinics have been closed or burned and in some areas (e.g. southern Yobe) the remaining Christian population is so little that they lack the force, resources and courage to re-engage.

Almost seventy per cent of the respondents indicated that church tithes and offerings were down. One third indicated offerings were down by half or more. The financial situation of the church is worst in places where violence caused people to relocate to safer areas, and where businesses were destroyed. For many their lives have been reduced to poverty. This affects church offerings as people already struggle to feed their family.

Support for the pastor has also dropped according to sixty-four per cent of the respondents; in more than one third of cases by fifty per cent or more. However, one third of respondents indicated that support for the pastor increased. Pastors lack support due to the reduction of membership and finances of Christians. In other places, Christians are determined to support the pastor through the violence and see it as part of serving God.

With regards to church activities, we notice the pattern of one third of the respondents observe an increase, while two thirds a decrease.

Chart 1. Observation of church membership over the past 10 years (according to respondents)



Christians in many areas call themselves a voiceless community under severe threat. Sixty-five per cent of the respondents feel that their human rights have been affected.

4.2 Personal Life

4.2.1 Christian Attitudes to Muslims

Violence often affects *inter-communal relationships*. We have tried to measure how the many years of violence in Northern Nigeria have affected Christian's attitudes to Muslims and vice versa.

To the question, 'How have feelings towards Muslims developed in your Christian community over the past ten years?' Eighty per cent of the respondents answered with 'negative' (33 per cent) or 'strongly negative' (47 per cent).

These negative feelings developed under the impact of riots, killings, acts of terrorism, church burnings, destruction, abductions, forced conversions, condescension, name calling, discrimination in employment, at the market and in school. Feelings Christians mention are - suspicion, hatred, distrust, animosity and fear towards Muslims. Their view of Muslims has changed as well. They are now seen as killers, terrorists, thieves, criminals and deceivers. The result is greater segregation between Muslim and Christian communities.


Many Christians say they face harassment, hatred, marginalization, intimidation and violence. They have very limited freedom to worship and to build churches. They have no real voice in public media, have hardly access to government positions for employment and are barely represented in local politics. Young Christians feel discrimination at school.

Christians in many areas call themselves a voiceless community that is under severe threat. Sixty-five per cent of the respondents feel that freedom of speech, association, religion and other human rights have been negatively affected.

In most cases, the application of human rights for Christians has decreased in their perception, most notably in the twelve Sharia states.

Three out of four respondents state that Muslim attitudes towards Christians are negative. Christians say ‘they desire to eliminate us’, ‘they consider us a danger that is threatening them and hate us passionately, as worst enemies’. According to Christians, Muslims are taught by radical preachers to consider Christians unclean infidels that are to be dominated and brought into Islam. The incidents of violence are so widespread and so frequent in Northern Nigeria that every Christian is negatively affected either directly or indirectly. Since the 1987 Kanfanchan crisis, the violence has escalated and now every Christian is born and bred in a ‘culture of violence’ regardless of when and where they are born in Northern Nigeria.

Chart 2. How have feelings towards Muslims developed in your Christian community over the past 10 years?



In response to the question, ‘How as a Christian in Northern Nigeria, do you see your future?’ almost half felt ‘strongly negative’ while another thirty three per cent answered with ‘negative’. As a consequence, three out of four Christians in Northern Nigeria see a bleak future for Christians in Northern Nigeria. Remarkably twenty per cent, one in five Christians, responded positively.

Three reasons were given:

1. a growing political awareness among Christians that their struggle is a struggle for liberation;
2. higher levels of awareness of violence and tighter security measures within Christian communities;
3. growing faith in the Christian God.

4.2.2 Behaviour of Christians

4.2.2.1 Interreligious relations

Violence also affects the way Christians act and operate in everyday life. In large parts of Northern Nigeria, shops are predominantly owned by Muslims. Due to the violence, Christians say that their purchasing at Muslim shops has decreased by half. In some cases though, it has increased (seventeen per cent). The decrease is due to a growing fear and mistrust among Christians of Muslim’s overcharging and even poisoning food, and a preference to support Christian over Muslim businesses. In other areas the decrease also is a result of Christians fleeing the area in search of security and refuge. The increase is mainly due to having no other option than to shop at Muslim-owned businesses in certain communities.

With regards to the numbers of Christian shopkeepers, forty-five per cent say the number has decreased while forty-three per cent see an increase. The decrease is the result of the violence as Christian shops are burned and looted and their owners and customers have relocated to safer areas. The increase is found in areas where Muslims have left and Christians arrived and where Christians form the (near) majority. Many Christians are unwilling to support Muslim shops and seek self-sufficiency in business.

Violence has led to further segregation of communities. The willingness of Christians to live among Muslims has dropped significantly. Eighty-eight per cent of respondents have been affected by the violence and of those, 65 per cent have even been very badly affected. Christians feel unsafe and afraid to live among Muslims due to religious related violence. Trust in the Muslim community has disappeared and some even call it suicidal to live among Muslims. One interviewee perseveres despite the hatred: “The Christians are selling their houses in Muslim dominated areas and relocating to other places that are more accommodating. My husband and I will never leave the Muslim dominated environment because God has been faithful; He is our protector and one of the many ways we can show them love is to live among them.”

Inter-religious marriage has decreased according to sixty-two per cent of the respondents due to growing distrust and segregation. Young women are now more aware of the dangers of marrying a Muslim (forced conversion into Islam, maltreatment and quick divorce). Before the crisis inter-religious marriage existed but

most Christian parents do not want their daughters to marry Muslim men, seeing it as unbiblical, dangerous and as recruitment for Islam. Some Christian parents have disowned their daughters for this reason.

Sixty-five per cent of respondents report that it has become more difficult for Christians to buy land from Muslims to build churches.

Muslims don't sell land to Christians because they don't want churches built or Muslims converting to Christianity. In Sharia states, the government does not allow the sale of land for church buildings and churches cannot be formally registered. Christians say Muslims have strong feelings of hatred and animosity toward them and do not want to live near them. The two religious communities are segregated with a widening social, cultural and religious gap.

4.2.2.2 Positions of Christians in society

Three out of four respondents say that it has become more difficult for Christians in Northern Nigeria to be promoted at work or find employment with the government. One interviewee declared: "They have vowed never to allow any Christian to reach the position of a Permanent Secretary, Director or any influential position of authority."

In many states and local government areas Muslims dominate and favour their brothers and sisters in faith, family and tribe. One respondent even mentioned that ninety-nine of job vacancies are exclusively for Muslims. And, anyone with a Christian name like Grace, John or David will not be employed. Sometimes Christians compromise by changing their names to gain employment. Others use bribes and some women exchange sex for employment.

An interviewee: "We see the need for political empowerment so we are going into politics in large numbers and we are more aware."

Christians defecting to Islam do not get much attention. One in five of the respondents however has seen Christians convert to Islam, but say they are bribed by money, marriage (e.g. young girls, widows) or career opportunities (e.g. to escape a life in hardship). In other cases people look for protection (e.g. charms, amulets), have doubts about their Christian faith (e.g. God doesn't


protect us from violence), or look for a way out of difficulty (e.g. release from jail, cancelling of debts or an end to receiving death threats).

One out of five respondents says that they have seen an increase in the number of Muslims converting to Christianity as a result of the violence. Reasons given are the love Christians show despite the violence, the guilt of Muslims after killing Christians and the visions and dreams of Jesus many Muslims are having. An interviewee shared: "Many among the Muslims want to become Christians, but they are afraid of being killed or pressured by fellow Muslims."

With regard to Christian involvement in politics in the north, the results are mixed. Forty per cent say that the involvement of Christians has decreased, while fifty-three per cent say it has increased. It seems the violence has resulted in more political involvement among Protestants and Evangelicals compared to Pentecostals. At a state level, there seems to be more political involvement among Christians in the southern Kaduna and Plateau states. Nevertheless, political involvement seems almost absent among Christians in violence ridden Borno and Yobe states.

The forty per cent decrease is related to the fear of being targeted during or after elections (e.g. 2011 post-electoral crisis). Christians experience local politics as a Northern Muslim partisan game where they are discriminated against and given no chance. Christians do not have a platform to be heard within political parties in the Northern states and in areas like Yobe and Borno States, they have lost all hope in politics.

Chart 3. Please state the extent in to which participation and influence of Christians in politics has increased/ decreased



The fifty-three per cent increase reflects a new dynamic in which Christians are fighting for their freedom through participation in politics. Christians want a voice in elections and to have access to power and resources. A quote from an interviewee: "We see the need for political empowerment so we are going into politics in large numbers and we are more aware." Christians are resisting the growing Muslim domination by actively seeking political self-empowerment through engagement in the political domain.

4.2.3 Spiritual and emotional well-being of Christians

Boko Haram has made it explicitly clear that its aim is to Islamize the whole of Nigeria and establish a caliphate based on Sharia. There is no room for Christianity. Many attacks on churches aim to scare Christians into abandoning their faith. The Fulani herdsmen attacks and the Sharia states have similar effects upon Christianity. The opposite however is proving to be true. While many churches have seen a decline in membership and attendance, those who have stayed show an increased commitment to their faith and church.

Personal prayer has increased according to 65 per cent of the respondents as in crisis people need spiritual strength and cry out to God. One interviewee declared: "The violence has awoken the members and they now see greater need for prayer... For me it has greatly increased my faith in God."

Fifty per cent say attendance to prayer groups and the practice of fasting has increased. Seventy per cent of respondents say the number of committed Christians in their church has grown.

The violence has brought many Christians to pray more intensely and to fast more to overcome the fear and challenges they face. An interviewee in Yobe even stated: "The violence is a revival. People who were not serious with Christianity have now embraced Christianity more than ever before – there was laxity before but the violence has awoken them."

According to eighty per cent of the respondents the number of Christians who persevere despite personal loss and trauma has grown. Many Christians daily face the challenge of life and death, they hold on to God, persevere in faith, live with the Bible, and experience miracles. A church member from Yobe: "The few who remain have suffered person loss of loved ones and property. We believe that God is the giver of all things and

he will replenish all that has been lost at the appropriate time. We are encouraged because we know Christians worldwide are praying for us." Those who have stayed and persevered despite the violence seem to be experiencing an increase in faith and a greater solidarity within the church.

4.2.4 Challenges for Christians

We asked the respondents to rate various challenges that the church in Northern Nigeria faces in terms of importance. Eighty-two per cent of the respondents said to understand 'religious violence, and 'love your enemies' is an important to very important spiritual challenge. Christians say that the biblical command to love your enemies and to pray for those that persecute you it is humanly impossible, but with the grace of God it can be done. Quotes from interviewees: "The church is aware of the religious related violence but not fully prepared to withstand it... love for the persecutors is very difficult, the church must work on that." (Kaduna) "The violence has developed hatred in Christians, so they need healing to love their enemies." (Yobe)

Next came the emotional challenge to cope with the trauma inflicted by the violence on the Christian community. Three out of four respondents said this was an important to very important challenge. Christians feel that trauma counselling to deal with emotional challenges is important for many of them are suffering in silence.

Economic and social challenges were deemed important to very important by 64 per cent of the respondents. Christians want to be free from Muslim economic domination, so if they have to restart their life after losing everything through violence, they are strongly motivated to go into business. But they often have no capital or training to do so. Christians explain that they used to be employed into the civil service but that these opportunities do not exist due to the crisis. Quote of interviewee: "Empowering Christians economically is very important for sustainable livelihood. It will also enable us to assist the indigent and to also preach the Gospel."

Christians observe that where Muslims and Christians live side by side, they carefully watch and monitor each other's actions. Christians see the challenge to overcome distrust, fear and hatred as paramount. Quote of interviewee: "We need to coexist – we need each other; if we integrate and exchange goods and service between North and South: tension and suspicion will be reduced, and trauma will be reduced."

Regarding the political challenge - dealing with civil rights abuses, access to political representation and government services, the respondents were divided. Forty-six per cent find this challenge important to very important, while 39 per cent find it not really important or not important at all. Those who found it more important tended to have more realistic hope for change in their region while those deeming it unimportant did not have much hope for change through politics. Quote from an interviewee: "Christians should be able to exercise their civic right without discrimination. We cannot continue to be slaves in our land."

4.3 Conclusions

Church attendance and membership decreased in the Far north violence ridden areas but increased in the Middle Belt states where many Christians relocated to.

The Church has mostly lost the strength and resources to engage in community projects, gives offerings and tithes and to support their pastors due to poverty amongst members.

Eighty per cent of the respondents have indicated that feelings towards Muslims in their community have been negatively affected under the impact of the persistent violence.

Sixty-five of the respondents feel that freedom of speech, association, religion and other human rights have been severely affected, most notably in the Sharia states.

Every Christian in Northern Nigeria is born and bred in a 'culture of violence' regardless of when and where they are born in the region.

Three out of four Christians in Northern Nigeria see a bleak future for Christians in Northern Nigeria. The persistent violence has led to a further segregation of the Muslim and Christian communities.

Three out of four respondents say that it has become more difficult for Christians in Northern Nigeria to be promoted at work or find employment with the government.

At a state level, there seems to be more political involvement among Christians in the southern Kaduna and Plateau states. Nevertheless, it seems to be almost absent among Christians in violence ridden Borno and Yobe states.

Despite this, there seems to be a new dynamic in which Christians are fighting for their freedom through participation in politics.

According to eighty per cent of the respondents, the number of Christians who persevere despite personal loss and trauma has grown. They seem to experience an increase in faith and a greater solidarity within the church.

To understand religious violence and to love your enemies are considered to be the biggest spiritual challenges Christians are facing.

To cope with the trauma inflicted by the persistent violence is understood to be the main emotional challenge.

The main economic challenge for Christians in Northern Nigeria is to empower themselves to gain a sustainable livelihood.

Christians say the main social challenge for them is to overcome mutual distrust, fear and hatred between them and their Muslim counterparts.

5 Responses and Perspectives

In this chapter we describe the responses of the church in Northern Nigeria to the violence and outline the things they believe should be done.³⁵

Our interviewees have observed that churches more recently confronted with violence (e.g. southern Borno and Northern Adamawa since 2011) are surprised, shocked, paralyzed, and unprepared for targeted violence. Churches with some history of violence say they are better prepared (e.g. Kaduna and Kano since 2000). There are several responses and perspectives that the Church in Northern Nigeria sees it should adopt in order to safeguard the well-being of Christians in the region. We explore current, mid and long term perspectives as well as specific approaches offering vision and strategy for the future.

5.1 Current strategies and perspectives

In the public domain when incidents of violence occur, churches condemn the violence, ask for peace, hold the government accountable and/or security forces for not having done enough to prevent the crisis, and appeal for help to stabilize the situation.

At the local church and denominational level, press conferences are held, days of fasting and prayer are invoked and church leaders discuss the crisis. At the local level churches publish press releases and preach sermons condemning the violence and those involved.

Our interviewees have observed that churches more recently confronted with violence (southern Borno and Northern Adamawa since 2011) are surprised, shocked, paralyzed and unprepared for such violence. Churches with some history of violence say they are better prepared (Kaduna and Kano since 2000).

Offerings are collected for the victims and as much help as possible is sent to the crisis area. When it comes to securing Christian property, church leaders regularly meet with security agencies and vigilante groups to implement security precautions. Sunday security measures are high (e.g. vigilance about strangers, visitors and strange cars, barricades and the use of scanning devices on entering churches).

At a political level, church congregations put high expectations on Christian politicians. An example is the previous governor of Plateau state who was said to be present at every crisis. Hope is placed on the influence of a righteous government under a Christian President of Nigeria. There is one example at church district level of a think tank, composed of lay professionals, to devise practical solutions to the urgent challenges. Issues that are addressed include security, food and housing, the problem of economic dependency of and political domination by Muslims, and the lack of biblical leadership and vision. The initiators would like to see this think tank at different levels within the structure of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the body responsible for fostering cooperation among churches. Some Church leaders, however, question the ability of CAN at state level to advocate freely for their rights as they suspect it or its employees to receive financial support from the state.

5.2 Mid to long term strategies and perspectives

The respondents to the interviews consider the churches to have little or no mid to long term strategy to address the persistent violence. Since they are not taking an analytical approach to the causes and solutions of the problem, the churches have no plan or perspective for the future.

According to our research, the root cause of persistent violence is the struggle for (political) power, for (scarce economic) resources and for recognition as a government stakeholder (state funds i.e. oil money) and promotion of Islam). This struggle is by political and religious elites at federal, state and local government levels. The struggle is coupled with a system of patronage which is embedded in violence and characterized by corruption and impunity.

Religion and ethnicity have core importance as they shape the identity of the main groups and are used by politicians to divide and conquer.

Since Obasanjo's regime and the return to democracy in 1999, religion has superseded ethnicity as an identity maker, as religion has the capacity to unite multiple ethnic groups for a common cause. Moreover, Christianity and Islam are more than identity shapers as they both promote ideas about a just and fair society, holding the ideals and aspiration of millions of their adherents. According to most Northern Muslims, the north had this kind of society in the Sokoto Caliphate and radical Muslims wanted a return to purer Islam like in the past Gwoza Caliphate.

This struggle for power and resources normally occurs within the secular context of a nation state with separate powers of governance and fair, just and equitable laws (*trias politica*). Everybody is equal before the law and has equal opportunities in society (in access to education, healthcare, politics and economics). This model, however, was brought to Nigeria with colonization and adopted after independence. Officially, Nigeria is a secular nation state. However, in reality, Nigeria is a mixture of many cultures and religions. Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religions have shaped its history, values and perspectives. The people of Nigeria still struggle with the idea of the nation state as their basic bonding is with tribes, ethnic groups, regions and religions. Finally, equality in Nigeria is frustrated by political domination, economic subjugation, corruption and patronage by political and religious elites that make people desperate enough to resort to violence.

Islam naturally embraces active participation in society through politics and economics (business) and offers Muslims a vision (Sharia) to do so. When the result of Muslim participation in Nigerian society leads to their political dominance over and economic subjugation of non-Muslims, the churches in Nigeria become vulnerable, because they have no adequate response. Protestant churches are particularly powerless in this regard due to the missionary legacy of a pietistic gospel. Christians are encouraged to follow Jesus, concentrating on their future destination in heaven. However, a holistic vision of the Christian Gospel is needed, derived from the perspective in which personal salvation is coupled with transformation in society. The Catholic Church is more resilient in this regard as it has developed strong social teachings.

In spite of the fact that the church has no official mid-long term strategy, our research has provided elements of a coherent vision and strategy for the future (as given by respondents):

Elements of this strategy can be:

To generate good leadership that can cope with the challenges of persistent violence. For the Church needs intelligent leaders with a profound vision about its role in the life of individuals and society. For this to happen, for example, the recruitment process for pastors would have to change. Pastors need to be genuinely called to serve the Church and not seek employment or material gain. Pastors need to be rigorously trained and in tune with the reality on the ground.

Following from this is **to prepare its members for religious related violence** through knowing their faith, following Jesus truly and suffering for His sake. The pastor of every parish needs to know the members of his congregation and to mentor and coach them. The Church also needs to be united for outreach (mission and social works) and to live out what the Bible says. It also includes equipping the Church how to deal with suffering and to act out the Biblical challenge to 'love your enemies'.

It also includes **to speak uncompromisingly about the root causes of the persistent violence**, with a clear perspective for the future. This means also to address them within the Church, where the leadership sometimes have been too close to the government. We need a new generation of Nigerians that is looking beyond the veil of politics, sees the difference with other nations, and is capable of surmounting the religious divide.

To invest in the youth of the Church so that they can find a way to live from the Christian perspective, and to stay calm in the midst of violence and how to react to it. This way, they can find alternatives for retaliation. Moreover, they need to learn how to empower themselves economically through setting up their own businesses or find employment.

To fight despair and cynicism caused by traumatization as a result of the persistent violence. This includes training trauma counsellors as well as providing in trauma counselling. It also involves making a stand for the Christian faith and its values and to get rid of the system of patronage politics, corruption and

impunity at all levels in society. For example, important politicians should in no way be considered holy. Moreover, their protection by immunity laws should be considered to be evil.

To tackle the existing dependency mentality.

This dependency mentality is one of the main reason why Christians are second-class citizens in Nigeria and not the Sharia system, according to some of our interviewees. Christians in the northern region are often not engaged in the domains of the economy, politics and education. He or she does not really want to advance in income, influence and knowledge through hard work, but is inclined to more easily relying on fate (e.g. donations to the pastor, sacrifices to the sorcerers) or people (e.g. rich family members, the money of politicians, government jobs). The Church must sensitize believers to this and motivate them to exchange this worldview for a biblical one. For in the biblical perspective, one can develop one's life by obedience to God and becoming productive stewards in society through using resources given by God. In the context of Northern Nigeria, the challenges are to create a secure environment (a nation state with an effective army and police) in which everybody is equal before the law (effective and equitable justice) and has equal chances (participation in education and healthcare, participation in the economy through employment or business, and participation in politics through democracy and a free press). The Church must facilitate this process of sensitization through for example organizing workshops and giving clear messages from the pulpit. Furthermore the Church must lay the necessary foundations to achieve these goals and to raise funds accordingly.

To increase political involvement in a meaningful and constructive way. This includes teaching Christian politicians how to apply Christian values in the political domain and in times of difficulty not to regress to traditional and occult practices like sorcery that often result in violence. For the Christian message of love, peace and forgiveness is strong and we can live by the teachings of Christ. Moreover prayer is a powerful weapon to bring the crisis under control where the powers of government, army and police cannot help. The Church has a role to play in the political domain. It also includes advocating with the government that the rights of minorities are secured, and that Christians in Northern Nigeria can have freedom of thought, conscience and religion, receive adequate protection and are no longer marginalized and discriminated against.

To enter into dialogue, peace initiatives and reconciliation with adherents of other faiths. This can include building bridges in communities through dialogue, multi-religious education and promoting equality. Meeting believers of a different religion can be a wake-up call for getting to know each other and to realize what they possibly suffer because of us. An example of the result of dialogue and reconciliation is a group of Muslims and Christians that wanted to go back to where they stay and live as they did before the persistent crisis. The condition for this however would be that leaders of religions must educate their followers about the containment of violence, the abolition of prejudice and the creation of an open mind-set towards the 'other'.

5.3 Approaches offering vision and strategy for the future

5.3.1 The dialogue, peace and reconciliation approach

The dialogue, peace and reconciliation approach is to teach Christians about Islam and Christianity. Justification for violence is easily read into the Koran and Old Testament. Islam especially has a tendency to encourage its adherents into violence, but not all Muslims promote violence, and many Muslims share a common rule with Christians to respect and value life. Nationhood can bind Muslims and Christians together and in this perspective relief materials should be shared with Muslims and affected communities on both sides, to rebuild. Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama, the Catholic Archbishop of Jos and President of the Catholic Bishop Conference of Nigeria, and with him the Catholic Church is practicing this approach.



5.3.2 The contextualized approach

The contextualized approach is to teach Christians to relate to Muslims, with great knowledge and respect for Hausa culture. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) under the presidency of Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor is practicing this approach with good effects, our interviewees report. Professor Andrew Haruna, head of the Department of Linguistics in Nigerian languages at the University of Jos and a Hausa Christian himself, has greatly contributed to this.

5.3.3 The peace and justice approach

The peace and justice approach of the Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa, the Church of the Brethren, in Nigeria comes from the historic peace churches (with the Quakers and the Mennonites), is to teach Christians to take a strong stance for non-resistance and pacifism. They have a great commitment to works of peace and justice and place a high value on human life and dignity. Some question the church's position in the context of the Boko Haram onslaught for the EYN was the direct target of religious related violence and many of its Christians relocated to safer areas. The church has lost much ground in the Northeast; will it be able to return?

5.3.4 The communal approach

Then there is the vision of Professor Yusuf Turaki, who believes that the church should redevelop a communal response. Christians, he says, have an individualistic approach to the conflict, while Muslims stand as a community. Christianity lost its communal dimension as a result of the missionary legacy from the West. According to the tradition of pietism and evangelicalism individual Christians should live exemplary lives according to high ethical standards and leave the communal problem including the political to be solved by the state. Nevertheless, if the state does not sufficiently protect its citizens - as is the case in Northern Nigeria with the Christian minority - ethical standards like being peacemakers and loving one's enemies will not solve the plight of the Christians. In the Western tradition, Christianity lost its communal dimension, including law and order. Turaki argues that Christianity should be redefined as a community of Christians, like the Israelites in the Old Testament. In this regard, he refers to the ideas of Dutch politician and theologian Abraham Kuyper (20th century) that led to a pluralistic state in the Netherlands where different social groups had autonomy within a general context of equality and justice for all. This approach suggests that a pluralistic state might be a solution for Nigeria.

5.4 Conclusions

The Church in Northern Nigeria responds in various ways to violence but in many areas does not have a mid- to longterm approach. As mentioned before, our research has identified several elements for a coherent vision and strategy for the future:

- **To generate good leadership that can cope with the challenges of persistent violence.**
- **To prepare its members for religious related violence** through knowing their faith, following Jesus truly and suffering for His sake.
- It also includes **to speak uncompromisingly about the root causes** of the persistent violence, with a clear perspective for the future.
- **To invest in the youth of the Church** so that they can find a way to live from the Christian perspective, and to stay calm in the midst of violence and how to react to it.
- **To fight despair and cynicism caused by traumatization** as a result of the persistent violence.
- **To tackle the existing dependency mentality.**
- **To increase political involvement in a meaningful and constructive way.**
- **To enter into dialogue, peace initiatives and reconciliation** with adherents of other faiths.

6 Conclusions

This chapter gives conclusions, scenarios and general recommendations for the church in Northern Nigeria.

6.1 Context of the Church in Northern Nigeria

Christianity has grown in Northern Nigeria from non-existent in 1857 to an estimated more than 30 million (31.2 per cent) now. This is a minority in a Muslim context, but a sizeable one. There are high concentrations of Christians in seven Northern states. In six Northern States Christians are in the majority. Christian existence in Northern Nigeria is under threat through persistent violence.

Perpetrators of *persistent violence* against the church in Northern Nigeria are the Northern Muslim political and religious elite, radical Islamic groups and Fulani herdsmen. They operate within an existing culture of violence through religious, political and territorial issues.

The interests at stake can be summarized as:

- (a) protection of Northern Muslim threatened interests (political - economic)
- (b) protection of Muslim's threatened identity (social-cultural)
- (c) protection of Islam's threatened 'legitimate' position as the dominant religion (religious).

6.2 Impact on the Church

For several reasons, Muslim perpetrators have persistently and violently targeted Christians in Northern Nigeria: they are the largest minority, there has been exponential church growth, the ethnic composition of Christian communities, and association with the West. Christians have also been targeted because of the protection of the above-mentioned interests. They have been the targets of politically motivated communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral riots, the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani herdsmen attacks, marginalization and discrimination through forced Islamization, Sharia state governments and Muslim society as a whole.

Persistent violence in Northern Nigeria is much larger and has more causes than commonly perceived. And the negative impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria is also more profound than many think. Between 2006 and 2014, an estimated 11,500 Christians have been killed. Between 2000 and 2014, up to 1.3 million Christians have been displaced and 13,000 churches have been destroyed or abandoned. The most affected communities are in the predominantly Muslim Far North where Christian communities have seen a decrease of over sixty per cent. Christians mainly relocate to the predominantly Christian Middle Belt (e.g. Plateau +75.6 per cent, Nassarawa +44 per cent, Benue +40 per cent and Taraba +30.4 per cent). At the same time Christian communities in the Middle Belt rural sub-region are the most vulnerable to Muslim herdsmen attacks (e.g. the same Benue, Nassarawa, Plateau and Taraba). In the same eight year period, church life declined substantially and dramatically in violence prone areas. Christian attitudes towards Muslims deteriorated due to their experiences of marginalization, discrimination and violence by Muslims. Christian behaviour toward Muslims changed for the worse due to fear of violence and mistreatment by Muslims. The result is much more distrust, antagonism and segregation.

The Christian faith however has remained strong. Although many church congregations have seen a decline in membership and attendance, those Christians that stay show an increased commitment to their faith and church. Participation in church activities, such as prayer, participation in prayer groups, study meetings and fasting has increased. Many experience God's rescue, protection and presence and persevere despite personal loss and trauma.

Christian communities in the hardest hit areas that remain are small (e.g. Tudun Wada Dankadai, Kano state), traumatized (e.g. southern Yobe) and inclined to resort to vigilante groups for self-defense (e.g. Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi state). Christian communities that receive fleeing

Christians (e.g. Jos, Plateau state; Yola, Adamawa state, Biu, Borno state) are overwhelmed by the humanitarian crisis and lack resources to cope with the urgent needs. The property of fleeing Christians is bought, confiscated or simply occupied by local or migrant Muslims (e.g. Southern Taraba state). Returning Christians find great difficulty in starting over again (e.g. Northern Adamawa). Church leadership so far lacks coherent vision, strategy and planning to cope with the crisis. How will this affect the future of the church? The Church in Northern Nigeria had its 'golden age' from the time of the first missionaries until the 1987 Kanfanchan crisis in which it expanded over the Middle Belt and made great inroads into the Far North. The impact since then of Muslim religious and political dominance, Islamic insurgencies and Muslim herdsmen attacks has led to Church decline in the Far North and an overburdening of the Church in the Middle Belt through relocating Christians. In certain areas the Church seems on the verge of extinction (e.g. southern Yobe and Tudun Wada Dankadai city, Kano state).

6.3 Scenarios

To summarize, the impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria can lead to two scenarios: *(Scenario 1)* Is the impact of persistent violence in the context of religion, politics, economics and culture simply too strong for the Church to withstand? Will the Church increasingly disengage from society in order to survive, fall into decline and over time cease to exist? In certain areas in Northern Nigeria, Christianity has already become virtually extinct.

(Scenario 2) Or can the impact of persistent violence in the context of religion, politics, economics and culture – be dealt with by the Church? Will the Church choose to increase its engagement in society, work for reconciliation,

There needs to be a united and proper response to end the violence and restore a situation in Northern Nigeria where Muslims and Christians alike can live together.

and share its resources to the benefit of all so the Church can work for renewal and transformation of the Christian community and Northern Nigerian society at large?

6.4 Recommendations

First, the Church must thoroughly analyse at a deeper level the challenges the Church in Northern Nigeria is presently facing. Then they must come up with a vision and strategy for the future, develop comprehensive and realistic solutions and apply these effectively. Church solutions must respond on the spiritual and emotional level, a socio-cultural level and on an economic and political level.

Secondly, policy makers in churches, government and society in Nigeria and in the international community should become aware of the scope and impact of the violence. There needs to be a united and proper response to end the violence and to restore a situation in Northern Nigeria where Muslims and Christians alike can live together, exercise their human rights and have equal access to education, work and property and will have the freedom to worship.

Afterword

Open Doors International (ODI) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) are discussing the implications of this report for the Church in (Northern) Nigeria.

A committee has been formed to develop:

- recommendations to develop an appropriate vision, strategy as well as plans and actions for the Church in Nigeria to effectively deal with the impact of persistent violence in order to increase the resilience of Christian communities, their properly functioning and serving of society for the common good, and;
- recommendations to develop an appropriate advocacy strategy, so the Church can speak effectively to the Nigerian government and the International community. This way they may know about the scope of this violence and its negative impact and respond in a proper way to end the violence, restore the situation to normality and deal with the negative consequences for Christian communities as well as intercommunal relationships.

Appendix 1

Methodology³⁶

The following methods were used:

Media Research (MR): through MR relevant articles, reports and other written sources were consulted via the Internet (e.g. International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Nigeria Watch), library (e.g. Africa Study Center, Leiden, the Netherlands) and other sources (e.g. contacts in Nigeria).

In Depth Interviews (IDI): IDIs were held with fourteen church leaders and scientists with expertise about persistent violence in Northern Nigeria.

Structured Interviews (SI): three geopolitical zones in Northern Nigeria were chosen and three states were selected in each of them:

- a. *Northeast zone* (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa)
– current focus of BH violence;
- b. *North-Central zone* (Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue)
– current focus of much of the Fulani herdsmen violence;
- c. *North-West zone* (Kano, Kaduna, Zamfara)
– current impact of Sharia conflict.

In each state, two churches were selected and classified according to their interaction with violence (ten churches per zone of which two are High Impact, two are Medium Impact and two are Low Impact):

- a. *High Impact (HI)*: a church or a Christian community has been directly affected by a high level of violence through either one or more of the following ways: pastor(s) killed, bomb attack(s), members killed, church(es) burned, women abducted, children abducted, many Christians have fled;
- b. *Medium Impact (MI)*: a church or a Christian community has been directly affected by a medium level of violence through either one or more of the following ways: no one or just a few are killed, little destruction of houses and/or church(es), church(es) closed, houses deserted, Christians have fled;

- c. *Low Impact (LI)*: a church or a Christian community has been indirectly affected by violence. The general atmosphere and insecurity in Northern Nigeria has impacted the Church's functioning. There are high levels of fear, threat letters may have been received, but no church has yet been closed, no houses are deserted and refugees from directly affected areas may have flocked to the Church or Christian community for shelter, food and medical assistance.

In each church, Structured Interviews were done with pastors, youth leaders, women leaders and three members (six interviews per church).

In total SIs, were done in three geopolitical zones; within each zone in six churches (two in each impact of violence category); within each church, six interviews, which make altogether 108 Structured Interviews in eighteen churches.

Focus Group Discussions (FGD); three FGD were held in each of the three geopolitical zones but in separate states, which altogether makes nine FGDs. Each FGD consisted of a mixture of representatives selected from churches with different levels of interaction with violence (HI, MI, and LI). Each FGD had some division between rural and urban churches. Preferable representatives for the FGD were from Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)-aligned Church Groups³⁷ (five categories). Representatives could be ordained or lay people, but were knowledgeable people and had an opinion about strategy, vision, problems, challenges and perspectives of the Church in Northern Nigeria.

Appendix 2

Nigerian Tribes³⁸

Tribal Characteristics: The *Hausa-Fulani* are a fusion of Hausa and Fulani peoples that merged during the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio and the subsequent Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century. The Hausa belong to an ethnic group that lives in North Nigeria and South Niger. The Hausa were farmers and petty businessmen. The Fulani belong to an ethnic group that is wide spread across West Africa from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Coast. The Fulani adopted Hausa language and culture in Nigeria. They are usually pastoralists, but many settled in cities. During the jihad of Dan Fodio, both groups turned into well trained warriors and their descendants ruled over the non-Hausa-Fulani who they enslaved. The Hausa-Fulani adapted to ruling under the British colonial administration tried to continue this during independence. Their attitude is characterized by a 'born to rule' mentality and many Hausa-Fulani serve into the Nigerian army. The Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslim.

The *Igbo* traditionally situated in south-eastern Nigeria, speak their common language Igbo. They are an educated, commercial and prosperous people who have spread all over Nigeria for the purposes of trade. Threatened by Hausa-Fulani hostility and domination in a time of widespread instability, the Igbo unsuccessfully attempted to gain independence as Biafra in 1967. (In 1966 10,000 – 30,000 Igbo were massacred in Northern Nigeria). The Igbo are predominantly Christian.

The *Yoruba* are a people in the south-west of Nigeria, Benin and Northern Togo. They speak the Yoruba language. They are traditionally craftsmen and traders, who lived in cities and eventually the Oyo Empire in the 17th century. This Empire declined in the 18th and 19th centuries and was invaded by the Don from Dahomey (Benin) and the Muslim Fulani from Northern Nigeria. The Yoruba have a strong cultural heritage with emphasis on education. Many Yoruba work in the educational sector in present Nigeria. They are made up of equal numbers of Muslims and Christians.

Intertribal relations: *The history of slavery* makes intertribal relationships in the Northern region very sensitive. The Sokoto Caliphate's economy was based on slavery with the non-Hausa-Fulani as objects and forced Islamic converts. Strong Resistance against the jihad with its slavery and forced conversion meant the Muslim Caliphate had little or no access to large parts of the Middle Belt. The British colonial administration however, put the Middle Belt and its inhabitants under Hausa-Fulani jurisdiction through its policy of indirect rule. This jurisdiction continued after independence in the States of Northern Nigeria. Resistance to Hausa-Fulani dominance in the spheres of religion, economics, culture and politics exists to this day and plays a significant role in intertribal relations within Nigerian society.

The struggle for resources is a second factor in intertribal conflict in the Northern region. Desertification in the North has brought Northerners to the Middle Belt states seeking work and employment. Pastoralist Fulani moving south in search of grazing land for their cattle often experienced violence from agriculturalist farmers. The effects of this mass immigration put great pressure on access to land, jobs and government funds. The greatest problems at present are unemployment of suburban young men and lack of land for Fulani pastoralists.

The indigene-settler divide is a third factor affecting intertribal relations in the Northern region. To avoid dominance of larger over smaller tribes in government participation, the Nigerian constitution asserts that "the President should appoint at least one minister of every state that is an 'indigene' of that state". While this ensures equal participation at the federal level, the opposite is true at the State and Local Government Area (LGA), for in many States minority tribes constitute the majority. So in effect, the concept of indigeneity was used to reserve rights and privileges for the natives (indigenes) and to exclude the non-natives (migrants or settlers). The settlers in turn seek to remove these limitations by other means including protest or force.

Appendix 3

A short political history of Nigeria³⁹

The Kanem-Bornu Empire around the Lake Chad basin existed from the 9th until the 19th century. It had a large territory and extended into areas of present day countries like Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. The Bornu part was created in the 14th century. Islam was introduced in the 11th century through Muslims scholars that arrived along the trans-Saharan trade routes from North -Africa. Kanem-Bornu functioned as an independent Islamic state until the 19th century when warlord and slave trader Rabih Zubayr, a fleeing Sudanese rebel, conquered large parts of Central Africa including Kanem-Bornu. In 1900 in Northern Cameroon, Rabih was defeated by the French who wanted to extend their influence into the interior of Africa. The remnants of the Kanem-Bornu Empire were divided between the British (Nigeria) and French (Niger, Chad) colonial parts of West and Central Africa.

The Kano Emirate was founded as one of the seven Hausa Bakwai ("Seven True Hausa States") in the 10th century in Northern Nigeria. It was situated at the end of the trans-Saharan trade routes coming from Tripoli, Tunis and Fès. Commerce was mainly done in leather, cotton and slaves. Islam came to Kano in the 14th century with Muslim scholars from the ancient Mali Empire situated to its West. Kano was a tributary state to different African Empires in subsequent centuries. In the 19th century Kano was conquered in the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio (see next paragraph) and became an emirate (1807) in the newly established Sokoto Caliphate. Under British indirect rule Kano remained an emirate and developed into the largest and most populous one of the Northern protectorate.

The Sokoto Caliphate was one of the largest Empires of West Africa in the 19th century. It covered parts of present day Burkina Faso, Niger, Northern Nigeria and Cameroon. The Empire was founded by Uthman Dan Fodio, its first Sultan and a radical Fulani Muslim cleric. Fodio instigated jihad from 1804 -1815 because of the bad governance in the Hausa states and the discrimination of his Fulani tribesmen. He gathered disenchanted Hausa and Fulani

behind him and conquered large parts of the region. Following his death in 1817 the Caliphate was divided into a Western (Gwandu as capital) and Eastern (Sokoto as capital) part. Eventually Muhammad Bello, Dan Fodio's son was recognized as second Sultan and gained control over the entire Caliphate. The Caliphate became the centre of power in the region, but disintegrated by the 1880s through internal rivalry. French and British colonial troops conquered its territory in 1903.

The Middle Belt, stretching like a wide belt through the middle of Nigeria, is ethnically and linguistically very heterogeneous. Large parts have never been conquered by Dan Fodio's jihad and many tribes actively resisted domination by the Hausa-Fulani in the Caliphate and its thirty Emirates. It was only the British who placed those areas under the jurisdiction of an Emir by their policy of indirect rule in the 20th century. At independence Middle Belters advocated for a separate Middle Belt entity apart from the Northern Hausa-Fulani dominated areas, but the Colonial Minority Commission recommended against it. Thus Northern Nigeria consisting of North Nigeria (predominantly Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri) and the Middle Belt (different other tribes) remained an undivided entity and is so till today.

Independence and first republic 1960 – 1966: Nigeria became an independent nation on 1 October 1960. As the 1959 elections resulted in no winning party, Chief Benjamin Azikiwe (Eastern region) was appointed as General Governor and Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Northern region) as Prime Minister. When Nigeria declared itself a republic in 1963, Azikiwe became President and Balewa remained Prime Minister. Ethnic and regional tensions soon emerged between the Hausa-Fulani (Northern region), Yoruba (Western region) and Igbo (Eastern region). These tensions were mainly to do with the differences in development between north and south. The North felt threatened by the Southern advantages in education and economics.

First period of military rule and civil war 1966 – 1979:

On January 15, 1966 young (Igbo) officers staged a coup assassinating several politicians including Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Balewa. The Igbo accused the 1963 census of overestimating the number of Hausa-Fulani in order to give the Northern region better representation in parliament. Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (Eastern region) emerged from the chaos as the new strongman. On July 29, 1966 Northern Muslims officers led a contra coup to revert the perceived Igbo domination. Christian General Yakubu Gowon (Northern region) was seen as a compromise candidate to head the Federal government.

In order to reduce tribal hegemony and competition Gowon made plans to divide the four existing regions (North, East, West and Lagos) into twelve states. Igbo's refused and on 29 May 1967 Lieutenant-Colonel Emeka Ojukwu declared the Eastern region as 'Biafra' independent. The civil war that ensued lasted until 1970 with an estimated death toll of 3.5 million. Nigeria remained undivided. On 29 July 29, 1975 Gen. Murtala Mohammed (Northern region) put an end to Gowon's regime for not honouring his promise to revert to civilian rule. Mohammed, however was assassinated on 13 February 1976 in an attempted coup for reasons of government weakness and corruption. General Olusegun Obasanjo's (Western region) chief of staff became head of state and prepared a return to civilian rule with a new constitution.

Second Republic 1979 – 1983: The new constitution was drafted and Alhadji Aliyu Shagari (Northern region) won general elections for the presidency in 1979, and was re-elected in 1983.

Second period of military rule, abortive third republic and third period of military rule 1983 – 1999: On December 31, 1983 Shagaru was overthrown by General Muhammadu Buhari (Northern region) to wide acclaim for ending an era of economic mismanagement, corruption and the widely seen rigged elections of 1983. The Yom Kippur war in 1973 and the Iraq-Iran war (1979) raised the price of oil spectacularly and as large quantities of money poured into Nigeria, political competition over access to these resources hardened. On August 27, 1985 General Ibrahim Babangida (Northern region) overthrew Buhari for reasons of corruption, misuse of power and failure to tackle the economic crisis. General Babangida promised a return to civilian rule by 1990 (the third republic). A constitution was adopted in 1989 and

elections were finally held in 1993. Rich businessman Moshood Abiola (Western region) won, but Babangida annulled the results claiming fraud, in an apparent effort to stay in power. Political chaos erupted and Babangida was obliged, in 1993, to transfer power to Chief Ernest Shonekan (Western region). Shonekan was appointed as interim leader until the next elections, but was unable to address the political and economic problems. General Sani Abacha (Northern region) ousted him on November 17, 1993. Abacha brought Nigeria back to military rule and had all of his political opponents imprisoned. His regime was brutal with several attempted coups. Promises for a return to civilian rule were made, but Abachi was not sincere. On June 8, 1998 he died of a heart attack at the age of 54 and General Abdulsalami Abubakar (Northern region) took his place. Abubakar prepared a return to democracy and well known General Olusegun Obasanjo (Western region) won presidential elections in 1999.

Fourth Republic 1999 – present: General Olusegun Obasanjo's election in 1999 ended sixteen years of military rule and he inherited a country with many problems (i.e. dysfunctional bureaucracy, collapsed infrastructure and corruption). Human rights were improved and freedom of press was installed, but a religious crisis erupted when enhanced Sharia law was adopted by twelve Northern states. Some governors of Northern states used the perceived threatened Muslim identity in a secular state as a means to get more power, putting the Federal Government at a distance. Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003. In the next presidential elections in 2007 Katsina State Governor Umaru Yar'Adua (Northern region) was elected with Bayelsa State Governor Goodluck Jonathan (Eastern region) as vice-president. Yar'Adua fell ill in 2009 and died May 2010. Jonathan became acting President from February 2010 and was elected as President in 2011. He stood for re-election in 2015. His presidency has always been contested by Northern Muslims as there is an unwritten agreement within the ruling party (PDC) that the presidency should alternate every eight years between the North and the South for the sake of national unity. Northern Muslims lost the presidency in 2010 and were desperate to regain it. Southern Christians wanted to retain the presidency for the same reason - access to the abundant state revenues through oil money. The Northern Muslims won the March 2015 elections and Muslim president Muhammed Buhari became president.

Appendix 4

The history of the Church in Northern Nigeria⁴⁰

The Colonial period from (1857 – 1954): Northern Nigeria was dominated by Islam throughout the Sokoto Caliphate, ruled by the Sultan in Sokoto and thirty subordinate emirs. These emirs were Lords and masters over their local populations. Around 1900 about fifty per cent of the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri population was Muslim and at independence this figure had risen to approximately eighty per cent. Large non-Muslim populations lived in the Middle Belt that either had resisted Islam or had not been Islamized.

With the advent of colonial administration in Northern Nigeria the British applied the policy of indirect rule. As the British valued the emirate structure of the Caliphate, this 'existing' structure was formalized as the emirs presented it to them. As a consequence the Northern region became divided into Muslim and Pagan emirates. The Pagan emirates were mostly non-Muslim, but the Muslim emirates did also contain significant numbers of non-Muslims.

The Anglican Bishop Crowther of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) established the first Northern Christian missionary station in Lokoja, present Kogi State. Crowther was of African descent and his missionary approach was gentle, encouraging a gradual process of leaving traditional beliefs and adopting Christian ones. CMS missionaries that arrived later however, advocated a more radical rupture. The results in terms of converts were few.

Colonial policy prevented missionaries entering Muslim dominated areas in the Far North for the first 30 years. Wanting to appease the hierarchy of the Sokoto Caliphate, the government sought to win cooperation with Britain. The government promised fair and just rule and non-interference with Islam in Northern Nigeria. As a

result, all inhabitants of Muslim emirates were considered Muslims. This prohibition also proved a blessing, as the limited missionary resources were fruitfully invested in the Pagan emirates in Northern Nigeria.

Seeds were planted in pagan districts by the influx of Faith missions: the Sudan Interior Mission (1894), the Sudan United Mission (1904), the United Missionary Society (1905) and the Seventh Day Adventist Mission (1905). African Independent churches arrived from the South in the 1930s and 1940s. Christianity slowly began to grow - churches were founded, Christian families established and Christian communities created.

The period of Independent Churches (from 1954 – 1987): Before Nigerian independence in 1960, missions thrived by utilizing native evangelists. Nationals were taking over and independent churches emerged. Some Protestant churches split due to leadership and tribal issues but the Church in general grew tremendously through its emphasis on education (schools), indigenization (native evangelists) and national leadership. Theological schools were established and the Bible was translated into local languages.

After independence however Muslim influence in northern Nigerian society grew. In 1964 the Northern Christian Association was formed to cope with growing Christian marginalization and discrimination under Muslim dominated Northern state governments. And in 1973 all missionary schools (except Bible schools and Theological Colleges) were taken over by the northern government and de-Christianized. In 1976, the Christian Association of Nigeria at the national level was formed to advocate for Christian rights in the context of a multi-religious society.

First appearing in the 1960s and '70s in the Northern region, Pentecostal and Charismatic churches began to flourish. Embraced by southern migrants and later by the non-Hausa-Fulani in the Middle Belt, these churches finally made inroads among Muslims in the Far North.

The period of Religious violence (from 1987 – present):

March 6, 1987, marked a turning point in Christian/Muslim relations in Northern Nigeria, with the Kanfanchan crisis erupting in Kaduna State. Until that date Muslims and Christians had lived in relative peace. In Kanfanchan 'long seated and deep feelings of resentment, prejudice and frustrations between Muslims and Christians, and from the [ed. majority Christian] local people against the [ed. Hausa-Fulani dominated] local government exploded that day'.

The Christian students of the Kanfanchan College of Education held a well-publicised 'Welcome to the Jesus Campus' banner and a pastor with a Muslim background made reference to the Koran in his sermon. This sparked a fierce reaction from the Muslim students who felt their religion was threatened by the Christian presence in the College. The conflict spread to the local population of Kafanchan town and its surrounding villages. 12 people were killed and 2 churches, 4 mosques and 29 private houses were destroyed. Riots broke out in the preceding days in Zaria (Ahmadu Bello University), Kaduna and other Northern cities. A total of 19 men were killed, and 169 hotels, 152 churches, 152 houses and 5 mosques were destroyed in six days of violence. On March 12, 1987 martial law was declared in Kaduna state.

Feeling their identity and interests were endangered in a secular Nigeria, Northern Muslims had unleashed their frustrations through the Kanfanchan incident. During

colonial times southern Christians had benefitted from westernization in the form of education, literacy and employment. At independence Northern Muslims were far behind their southern neighbours and felt threatened by Christian domination and migration to the North. Growing Christianity in the Middle Belt was an even bigger threat. To counteract Christian influence, Northern Muslims developed a policy of 'Northernization' in which all leadership positions were kept in Muslim hands to safeguard Muslim identity. The impact of this policy was greatly felt among Christians in the Middle Belt where Muslim control allowed little space for Christian churches to prosper. This policy led to growing fears among southern Christians of domination by a 'demographic Muslim majority' in the country as a whole.

The debate in 1978 about the establishment of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal and the 1986 application of Nigeria for membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, justified Christian fears. The growth in the North of radical Muslim groups through links with other Islamic nations and the rapid increase of Pentecostal and Evangelical churches in the North fuelled suspicion from both sides. In the Middle Belt memory of the Sokoto Caliphate, with its enslavement of non-Muslims, was still very much alive and showed itself in the political dominance of Muslim Fulani emirs over the mainly Christians. Tensions were escalating.

Riots followed - the Kano riots in 1991 (Reinhardt Bonke campaign) and 1995; the Kaduna riots in Zangon-Kataf in 1992; the Katsina riot in 1991; the Bauchi riots in Tafawa Balewa in 1991, 1994, 2000 and beyond; the Borno riots in Potiskum in 1994 and Maiduguri in 1998; and the Plateau riots in Jos city and Plateau State in 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012.

Notes

- 1 30 million is the estimated number of Christians, based on figures of Open Doors International research, the World Christian Database and figures presented by professor Ga.
- 2 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', paragraph 7.4 and paragraph 8.2.
- 3 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', chapter 8 'Impact on the Church', paragraph 8.1.
- 4 Kukah, Rev'd Fr. M.H. (1993); 'Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria', Spectrum Books Lagos, 1993.
- 5 Cf. Ostien, Philip and Albert Dekker (2010); 'Sharia and national law in Nigeria', Chapter 13 in 'Sharia Incorporated, a comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve Muslim countries in past and present', edited by Jan Michiel Otto, Leiden University Press, 2010.
- 6 Cf. Loimeier, Roman (1997); 'Die radikale islamische Opposition in Nordnigeria', Africa Spectrum 32, 1997, 1:5–23. Cf also Loimeijer, Roman (1997); 'Islamic Reform and Political Change; The Example of Abubakar Gumi and the Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria', in 'African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists', edited by Eva Evers Rosander and David Westerlund, Hurst and Company, London, 1997.
- 7 ICG (International Crisis Group) 2014); 'Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency', Africa Report No.216, 3 April 2014; see link: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf>
- 8 The process of fertile land transforming into desert typically as a result of deforestation, drought or improper/inappropriate agriculture.
- 9 Cf. Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (March 2015); 'Migration and Violent-Conflict in Divided Societies: Non-Boko Haram Violence against Christians in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria', NPVRN Working Paper No. 1, Abuja-Nigeria; For World Watch Research, Open Doors International, Netherlands; see link: <https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/research/3777637>
- 10 Cf. p. 52-55 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); 'Violent Conflict in Divided Societies: The Case Study of Violent Conflict in Taraba State (2013 - 2015)', NPVRN Working Paper No. 2, Abuja-Nigeria; For World Watch Research, Open Doors International, Netherlands; see link: <https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org>
- 11 Cf. HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2007); 'Criminal Politics: Violence, "Godfathers" and Corruption in Nigeria', Volume 19, No. 16 (A), October 2007.
- 12 A church district (district church council or DCC) consists of a number of local church councils (LCC). An LCC is a small diocese or district consisting of several local churches. At the time of writing, EYN consisted of 2,280 local churches and 456 LCCs. Out of 456 local church councils, 278 have been destroyed and out of 2,280 local church branches, 1,390 have been have been destroyed.
- 13 Cf. Awayi, Rev. D.D. (2014); 'Christian molestation and plight in Yobe State', not published, in Open Doors' possession.
- 14 Cf. p. 52-55 in Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Alypse Ben (November 2015); op cit.
- 15 Cf. ICG (International Crisis Group) (2012); 'Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos crisis', Africa Report No. 196, 17 December 2012; see link: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/196-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-i-the-jos-crisis.aspx>
- 16 A local government area (LGA) is an administrative division of a state in Nigeria that a local government is responsible for. Nigeria has 36 states and 774 local government areas. It is more or less equivalent to a district.
- 17 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Chapter 2 'Figures, features and trends', paragraph 2.1.
- 18 Religious figures are highly controversial in Nigeria. When this report was presented to Nigerian church leaders in the fall of 2015, these statistics were challenged in saying that they underestimate the population and percentage of Christians. One of the reasons they forwarded was the fact that during the last census in 2006 no religious demographic information was taken. Many leaders see this as a silent acknowledgment of Muslims who insisted religious information must not be in the census and of Christians being in the majority now.
- 19 Adherents of ATR plus < 1% adherents of other religions and non-religious.
- 20 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Table 1 in Appendix 4: Christian and Muslim populations in northern states.
- 21 Cf. pp. 35-37 in Falco, di Jean-Michel di Falco, Timothy Radcliffe and Andrea Riccardi (dir.); 'Le Livre noir de la condition des Chrétiens dans le monde', by, XO Editions, Paris, 2014.
- 22 Cf. Open Doors calculations based upon:
- website with database of Nigeria Watch <http://www.nigeriawatch.org>
 - Chouin, Gérard, Manuel Reinert and Elodie Apard (2014); 'Body Count and Religion in the Boko Haram Crisis: Evidence from the Nigeria Watch Database', French Research Institute in Africa (IFRA)-Nigeria African Studies; See link: https://www.academia.edu/4245284/2014_-_Religion_and_bodycount_in_the_Boko_Haram_crisis_evidence_from_the_Nigeria_Watch_database
 - Conroy, Stone (2014); 'Land Conflicts and Lethal Violence in Nigeria: Patterns, Mapping and Evolution (2006 – 2014)', French Research Institute in Africa (IFRA)-Nigeria Working papers Series No. 38, 28/11/2014.
 - French Research Institute in Africa (IFRA)-Nigeria Watch, Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2014), June 2014. See link: <http://www.nigeriawatch.org>
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 - Olayoku, Philip (2014); 'Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006-20014)', French Research Institute in Africa (IFRA)-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 3, 28/11/2014.
- Olojo , Akinola Ejodame (2014); 'Muslims, Christians and religious violence in Nigeria: patterns and mapping' (June 2006–May 2014), French Research Institute in Africa (IFRA)-Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 32, 27/11/2014.

23 Cf. 'Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006-2014)', by Philip Olayoku, IFRA Nigeria Working Papers Series No. 3, 28/11/2014, and 'Land Conflicts and Lethal Violence in Nigeria: Patterns, Mapping and Evolution (2006-2014)', by Stone Conroy, IFRA Nigeria Working Papers, Series No. 38, 28/11/2014. Cf. example: cf. Adamu and Ben (March 2015) and (November 2015), op cit. idem

24 Cf. overview 'Facts and Figures, Nigeria: Horror in numbers', by Amnesty International, 3 June 2015; see link: https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/facts_and_figures.pdf

25 Cf. OCHA – North East Nigeria Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 January 2015): http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NE_Snapshot_Jan30.pdf

26 Cf. Nigeria: 'New President Should Address Abuses, Act Boldly on Violence, Corruption, and Lack of Accountability', Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2015: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/26/nigeria-new-president-should-address-abuses>

27 Cf. OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2015); 'North East Nigeria Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 January 2015)'; see link: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NE_Snapshot_Jan30.pdf

28 An estimated 13,000 churches have been destroyed, burned or closed and according to local church leaders, congregations in Northern Nigeria consist of an average number of 50-100 members/affiliates. Therefore, it is likely that about 1.3 million Christians have most likely been affected and forced to flee or relocate.

29 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Chapter 2 'Figures, features and trends', paragraph 2.1.

30 Figures for one major denomination in each of the 5 blocks of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) were given. These blocks are: SCN - Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, CCN - Christian Council of Nigeria. CPFN/PFN - made up of Pentecostal Churches, OAIC - Organisation of African Instituted Churches, ECWA/TEKAN - Evangelical churches. The 5 major denominations were respectively: Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Assemblies of God Church, Celestial Church of Christ, Evangelical Church Winning All.

31 See Table 2. In Appendix 10. Political and religious affiliation of northern (deputy) governors.

32 Based on statistics from October 2014, by Open Doors researchers in Northern Nigeria

33 Cf. Jenkins, op cit, p. 100. These distinctive features look much alike factors Philip Jenkins describes that are responsible for the decline of the Church in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. He describes the history of the Church in these regions in three distinct periods. First there is its golden age from the apostles until the 14th century when the Christian faith spread to China, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, and flourished in bishoprics, with beautiful cathedrals and renowned universities. Even under Islam from the 8th century Christians lived in relative peace. The Eastern Church engaged its largest missionary enterprise in Asia, and Muslim lands in the Middle East became largely Christian. From the 14th - 19th century however, Christianity fell into decline caused by climate change (economic), tribal migrations (social) and the Mongol invasions (religious-political). It lost its majority status, became a minority in different lands and collapsed in a mixture of warfare and religious related violence, leaving only small communities behind (e.g. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq). Finally, since the 20th century, Christianity has ceased to exist in organized form and a Muslim world free of Christians is emerging (e.g. Turkey, Iraq and Syria).

34 Cf. Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Appendix 2: List of Structured Interviews.

35 Cf. Outcomes of In Depth Interviews, Structured Interviews and Focus Group Discussions. See Appendix 1, 2 and 3 of academic version of the report.

36 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Chapter 1: 'An Impact Study', paragraph 1.2 'Methodology'.

37 To qualify for the membership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) a church must have been registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990 or previous legislation and shall belong to one of the five Church Groups, namely: * Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN); * Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN); * Christian Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (CPFN) / Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN); * Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC); * TEKAN and ECWA Fellowships; <http://cannigeria.org/membership/>.

38 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Chapter 5: 'Northern Nigeria in Context', paragraph 5.1 'Early Developments'

39 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Chapter 5: 'Northern Nigeria in Context', paragraph 5.2 'Recent Developments'.

40 Cf. Academic full report 'The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria', Chapter 7: 'The Church in Northern Nigeria'. See also:

- cf. Crampton, E.P.T., M.A., B.D (1979); 'Christianity in Northern Nigeria', printing Geoffrey Chapman, London.
- Gaiya, Musa A.B. (2004); 'Christianity in Northern Nigeria, 1975-2000, in Exchange, Volume 33, Issue 4, 2004.
- Gaiya, Musa A.B. (2014); Proposed additional text of 'Epilogue 1975 – 2010' for a new edition of Crampton's 1979 book, received from the author, September 2014.



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